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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, billions of dollars are contributed to corporations by
persons who are neither owners nor shareholders of those corporations.1
These contributions, categorized under the income tax laws as "non-
shareholder contributions to capital,"2 play an important economic role
1. One knowledgeable source has estimated that $30 billion a year is contributed by state
and local governments alone as incentive for firms to locate in an area. See the comments of Don-
ald Haider, Professor at Northwestern University's business school, contained in Donald Haider,
Controls Are Needed For State Battles Over Businesses, Chi. Trib. at C25 (Aug. 18, 1989). For
further discussion of the magnitude of these transactions, see notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
2. These contributions are "nonshareholder" in nature because the contributing parties do
not become shareholders or owners of the corporations as a result of making the contributions. For
an introduction to the taxation of nonshareholder contributions to capital, see William D. An-
drews, Basic Fundamental Income Taxation 396-401 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1991) ("Andrews
Taxation"); Michael J. Graetz, Federal Income Taxation 256-59 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988)
("Graetz Taxation"). For more extensive analyses of this area, see William B. Landis, Contribu-
tions to Capital of Corporations, 24 Tax L. Rev. 241 (1969); Note, Taxation of Nonshareholder
1458 [Vol. 45:1457
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in subsidizing the construction of new factories and other improve-
ments to the nation's infrastructure.
This Article concerns the federal income tax treatment of the two
principal categories of nonshareholder contributions to capital, which
together encompass the great majority of these transactions.3 The first
category consists of contributions made for the purpose of obtaining ec-
onomic development. Typically, this occurs when governments and bus-
iness groups contribute property to corporations in order to persuade
those corporations to construct factories and other facilities in their lo-
cal areas. These contributions are made to the firms so that the local
area will benefit from the jobs and economic stimulation provided, as
positive externalities,' by the operation of the factories in the vicinity.
Under present law, corporations are not taxed on contributions
they receive for economic development.5 When, for example, a corpora-
Contributions to Corporate Capital, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 619 (1969); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of
Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 604-13 (1965). See also Mark E. Larson, Jr. and
Julius A. Jove, Customer Contributions to Utilities Continue to Create Income Problems, 45 J.
Tax. 194 (1976); Brooke Pearson, United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad: A New
Test For Nonshareholder Contributions to Capital, 27 Tax Law. 503 (1974); J. Malcolm Harris,
Federal Income Tax Exclusion of Non-Shareholder Contributions to Capital, 39 Tex. L. Rev. 623
(1961); Note, Tax Consequences of Non-Shareholder Contributions to Corporate Capital, 66 Yale
L. J. 1085 (1957).
3. The importance of these two specific categories to the general subject of nonshareholder
contributions to capital is evidenced by the dominant role the two categories play in discussions of
the area. See, for example, Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, 3 Federal Taxation of Income,
Estates and Gifts 9.1 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2d ed. 1991); Andrews Taxation at 396-401
(cited in note 2); Graetz Taxation at 256-59 (cited in note 2).
4. An externality may be defined as a side effect of a process that affects, negatively or posi-
tively, other parties through nonmarket processes. Thus, because the externalities function outside
of market processes, normal market functions such as price determinations do not respond to these
externalities in a corrective manner. Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 449-50 (McGraw-Hill, 11th ed.
1980) (describing externalities having a positive effect on others as "external economies"); Harry S.
Rosen, Public Finance 143-47 (Richard D. Irwin, 1985) (describing externalities having a positive
effect on others as "positive externalities"); Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public
Finance in Theory and Practice 56-58 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 1976). A factory may have positive
externalities on a merchant in the local area, for example, in that the factory might employ addi-
tional people who would purchase goods from the merchant. This is not to say that all of the
externalities created by economic development (the new factory) will be positive. See note 77 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the negative externalities that may accompany this develop-
ment. My only point is that communities purchasing economic development by making contribu-
tions to firms clearly are doing so for purposes of obtaining the positive externalities that are
generated by the development.
5. Corporations are allowed to exclude contributions to capital from income. I.R.C. § 118(a)
(West 1992). In turn, Treas. Reg. % 1.118-1 (1960) defines a contribution to capital as including
nonshareholder contributions, such as "the value of land or other property contributed to a corpo-
ration by a governmental unit or by a civic group for the purpose of inducing the corporation to
locate its business in a particular community, or for the purpose of enabling the corporation to
expand its operating facilities." See Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950) (holding
that buildings contributed to a corporation by a community group as inducement for location of a
factory are contributions to the corporation's capital). Subsequent to the Brown Shoe decision, the
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tion receives "free" land from a state government as an inducement to
construct a factory, the law generally allows the corporation to exclude
the value of the land from its taxable income.' Present law thus implic-
itly assumes that the corporation does not have income, defined as an
accretion to wealth,7 from the receipt of the land.
Supreme Court purportedly refined the definition of contributions to capital in United States v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 412 U.S. 401 (1973). For the Court's analysis of con-
tributions to capital that, without reversing Brown Shoe, adds other criteria to the legal definition
of these transactions, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 412 U.S. at 413. However,
the Brown Shoe decision continues to be the controlling precedent in this particular area, having
been recently embraced by the Internal Revenue Service as the conceptual framework for deter-
mining the tax treatment of these transactions after the 1986 Tax Reform Act. See IRS Notice 87-
82, 1987-2 C.B. 389, 390 (1987) (citing Brown Shoe while pointedly ignoring Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad). For a more thorough discussion of the case law in this area, see Landis, 24 Tax
L. Rev. at 242-46 (cited in note 2); Pearson, 27 Tax. Law. at 504-10 (cited in note 2). For addi-
tional discussion regarding the basis of property contributed by nonshareholders to a corporation,
see note 6.
6. The tax treatment of this particular type of contribution originated in an early Supreme
Court decision holding that contributions made by the Cuban government to a railroad operating
on the island were not included in the corporation's income. Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S.
628 (1925). This decision was effectively codified by Congress when it enacted the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, which, in turn, was followed in the 1986 Internal Revenue Code. See § 118(a) of the
Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1986; Landis, 24 Tax L. Rev. at 243 (cited in note 2). This
favorable tax treatment, however, is not available to the corporation without a cost. A corporation
excluding these contributions from its taxable income is not allowed to receive any tax basis for
the property received. I.R.C. § 362(c) (West 1992). Thus, although a corporation may exclude these
assets from income, the corporation is not allowed to enjoy the additional tax benefit of recovering
(i.e., deducting) the costs of the assets when those assets are later sold or depreciated. For a his-
tory of this particular provision, see Andrews Taxation at 398-400 (cited in note 2). Present law,
however, is still quite favorable to these types of transactions, even though the recipient corpora-
tion is not allowed any tax basis for the contributed asset. The corporation is still better off under
present law's treatment of excluding the asset from income and receiving no basis in the asset, in
comparison to the alternative of including the asset in income and receiving a corresponding basis.
The reason for this is simple-although the total amount of taxes paid under the two alternatives
will be equal under certain conditions, the former alternative delays or defers the payment of tax,
and thus is the more desirable alternative because of the time value of money. Thus, the tax ad-
vantage granted under present law to these types of contributions consists of deferral, that is,
delaying the payment of taxes. For a general discussion of the substantial value of deferral to
taxpayers, see William A. Klein, et al., Federal Income Taxation 62-66 (Little, Brown & Co., 8th
ed. 1990); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 722,
723-30 (1990); Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1019, 1021; Mark P. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange: The Taxation of Joint Ventures Between
Labor and Capital, 44 Tax L. Rev. 519, 524 (1989); Noel B. Cunningham and Deborah H. Schenk,
How To Tax The House That Jack Built, 43 Tax L. Rev. 447, 451-56 (1988) (discussing the
problems of deferring recognition of imputed income).
7. Modern tax scholarship generally utilizes the "Haig-Simons" definition of economic in-
come as the consumption of the taxpayer plus the change in the value of the taxpayer's property
rights for the particular taxable period. Thus, accretions to the taxpayer's wealth are included in
economic income under this definition. See, for example, Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion
Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale L. J. 1817, 1819 (1990); Daniel N. Shaviro, Selec-
tive Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1189, 1190 (1989); Fellows, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
at 723 (cited in note 6); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of
Money," 95 Yale L. J. 506, 508-09 (1986).
NONSHAREHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS
The second category consists of contributions by customers of spe-
cialized assets to corporations who will use these assets in providing fu-
ture services to the customers. For example, assume an individual
homeowner moves to a house in a rural area that lacks water service
(i.e., no facilities exist that connect the house with lines maintained by
a utility water company). Typically, if the homeowner desires to obtain
water service the homeowner will be required to make a contribution,
termed a "contribution in aid of construction," to a utility company of
the costs of extending a water line to the residence.8 Under present law,
the utility company would be required to recognize taxable income from
the receipt of the water line equal to the line's fair market value.9
I believe that present law's treatment of these two categories of
contributions is perversely flawed. In this Article I propose to reverse
the taxation of these two categories of contributions. I would fully tax
corporations receiving contributions for economic development, while
allowing corporations receiving contributions of specialized assets from
customers to exclude such items in their entirety from income.
Briefly, the rationale for my proposals is as follows. Corporations
receiving contributions from governments for economic development
recognize economic income (i.e., an accretion to wealth) because they
are able to auction off the positive externalities of economic develop-
ment generated by their new factories, while at the same time retaining
for themselves all of the factories' private returns. In contrast, corpora-
tions receiving contributions of specialized assets from customers gener-
8. Although the discussion of these contributions is not confined to transactions involving
regulated utilities (see, for example, notes 156-58 and accompanying text), they are referred to in
the text because of their importance and illustrative value. For a brief introduction to the histori-
cal treatment of contributions in aid of construction under the Internal Revenue Code, see Graetz
Taxation at 258 (cited in note 2); Andrews Taxation at 400-01 (cited in note 2). Prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act"), contributions in aid of construction had been treated as
nonshareholder contributions to capital, and accordingly were excluded from the recipient corpora-
tion's income. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 at 544 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987) ("Blue Book-1986 Act"). In the 1986 Act,
Congress changed the treatment of contributions in aid of construction to require the inclusion of
these amounts in the taxable income of the recipient corporation. I.R.C. § 118(b) (1986); Blue
Book-1986 Act at 544-47 (stating that contributions in aid of construction are no longer considered
to be contributions to capital, and are, accordingly, included in the corporation's income).
9. Present law regards the utility company as receiving payment from the homeowner, in
advance, for water services the utility will be providing to the homeowner in future periods. Tax
Reform Act of 1985, Report of the Committee on Ways and Means House of Representatives on
H.R. 3838, H.R. Rep. No. 99-426. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 643-44 (1985) (stating that the provision
taxing these contributions, ultimately adopted in 1986, is intended to tax utilities receiving prepaid
income from customers); Blue Book-1986 Act at 544 (cited in note 8). For a general discussion of
the federal income taxation of prepaid income, see Boris I. Bittker, 4 Federal Taxation of Income,
Estate and Gifts § 105.3.4. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1981); Stanley S. Surrey, et al., Federal
Income Taxation 621-31 (Foundation Press, 1986). For a criticism of these rules generally applica-
ble to prepaid income, see note 241.
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ally experience no significant accretion to wealth. Rather, the economic
benefit of the contributed assets continues to inure to the customers
initially making the contributions, not the corporations receiving them.
Thus, the corporations should not be taxed upon the receipt of assets
from which they will receive no future benefits.
Part II of the Article discusses the problems created by the treat-
ment of these contributions under present law. In addition to various
doctrinal difficulties, present law creates unattractive results in both
categories of nonshareholder contributions to capital. The undertaxa-
tion of corporations receiving contributions for economic development
raises troubling issues of equity. Corporations are receiving huge pay-
ments, frequently in the hundreds of millions of dollars, from state and
local governments, without paying any federal income tax on these ben-
efits. I believe that such a situation is unfair and inappropriate. In con-
trast, the overtaxation of contributions involving specialized assets
raises concerns regarding the allocation of resources. Essentially, pre-
sent law is seriously overtaxing an important area of economic activity,
thus discouraging investments of capital in this area and potentially di-
verting economic resources into other sectors of the economy.
Part III of the Article discusses contributions for economic devel-
opment and develops an argument that corporations should be taxed on
these contributions. Corporations receiving these contributions have in-
come-i.e., an accretion to wealth-upon their receipt, largely because
of market failures in the market for economic development. I acknowl-
edge that in a perfectly competitive market, corporations would not
have income from receiving these contributions. However, due to seri-
ous imperfections and failures in the market for economic development,
corporations are able to extract income from selling the externalities
associated with their new factories and other facilities. Hence, they
should be taxed on that income.
Part IV of the Article discusses contributions by customers of spe-
cialized assets to corporations who will use those assets in providing
future services to the customers. The economics literature dealing with
transactions costs and their impact on economic organization have re-
ferred to such specialized assets as "transaction-specific assets." 10 Al-
10. Oliver Williamson, Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and Strategic Behavior
64-66 (Basil Blackwell, 1987) (providing a definition and examples of transaction-specific assets).
The term "transaction-specific assets" was apparently coined by Professor Williamson, who has
written extensively on the impact of such assets on economic organization and structure. See, for
example, Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Organization 177-81 (New York Univ., 1986); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 30-32 (Free Press, 1985); Oliver E. William-
son, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & Econ.
233, 239-42 (1979). In addition, other economists have written widely on the impact of such assets
on economic activity, although the federal income tax implications of transactions involving these
1462 [Vol. 45:1457
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though this literature is not concerned with tax policy, this Part
examines its implications for my argument that corporations receiving
contributions of these transaction-specific assets do not experience ac-
cretions to wealth from their receipt. Rather, the economic returns from
the contributed assets continue to inure to the benefit of the customer,
not the corporation. The literature on transaction-specific assets sup-
ports this conclusion and its resulting implication that the receipt of
these properties by corporations should not trigger payment of tax.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PRESENT LAW
A. Conceptual Difficulties
As a policy matter, the determination whether a corporation has
realized economic income from receiving a contribution should provide
the underlying basis for taxation. In contrast, the current tax treatment
of nonshareholder contributions to capital is extremely confused and
based on factors that have no legitimate policy rationale.
For example, current law places enormous importance on whether
the person making the contribution to the corporation does so as a con-
dition of receiving future services from the corporation.11 If a party
makes a contribution in order to receive subsequent services from the
corporation, the law generally requires the corporation to recognize tax-
able income on the grounds that the contribution represents payment
in advance for services to be provided later.1" This rule effectively gov-
erns the taxation of contributions of specialized assets, i.e., transaction-
specific assets, from customers to corporations. The fact that these con-
assets has not been previously discussed. See, for example, Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and
the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J. L. Econ. & Org. 95, 103-11
(1988); Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: the Case of Coal-burning
Electric Generating Plants, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 33, 36-39 (1985); Thomas M. Palay, Comparative
Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. Legal Stud., 265, 268-
69 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Ap-
propriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & Econ. 297, 298-302 (1978);
Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J. Econ. 426, 432-36 (1976).
11. The determination as to whether the person making the contribution to the corporation
is doing so for the purpose of receiving future services from the corporation is the principal crite-
rion for determining whether the corporation is taxed upon the receipt of the contributions. See
Blue Book-1986 Act at 545-46 (cited in note 8) for an extensive discussion of the procedures for
determining whether the fatal nexus to services exists in various situations. See also IRS Notice
87-82 at 389 (cited in note 5) (stating that contributions made to receive future services are taxable
to the corporation, while contributions made for the "benefit of the public as a whole" are not
taxable). Thus, the motive of the person making the contribution becomes the point of focus in
determining the taxation of these amounts. For a general criticism of tax provisions that are based
on the motive of the payor, see Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v. Commissioner: Musings About Debt
Cancellations and "Consumption" in an Income Tax Base, 45 Tax L. Rev. 677, 694 n.88 (stating
that "[g]ifts aside, it is hard to see why the [payor's] motive should exempf the [payee] from tax").
12. See note 9 for a discussion of the rules regarding taxation of prepaid income.
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tributions precede the provision of services by the corporations to the
customers results in these contributions being taxable to the recipient
corporations.13
This rule fails to reflect the economic realities underlying transac-
tions involving these assets. If a prospective customer contributes a spe-
cialized asset to a corporation that is dedicated for specific use by the
corporation in providing future services to the customer, it is fallacious
to view the customer as prepaying the corporation for services. Instead,
the more accurate view, subject to certain exceptions discussed later in
the Article, 14 is that business exigencies require the customer to invest
capital in the specialized asset in order that the two parties might con-
summate future transactions. Here, the customer is the party that is
investing its capital in the specialized asset" that will be used in the
future when the customer purchases services from the corporation. In
such a situation, the economic benefit or rate of return from the capital
investment in the asset will inure to the benefit of the customer, not the
corporation." Thus, it is simply incorrect, as a general matter, to view
the corporation as receiving income of any kind from the receipt of the
contribution.7
In contrast, if the contribution to the corporation does not precede
such a service-providing relationship, as is the case with contributions
for economic development, present law typically allows the corporation
to exclude the contribution from income.' 8 This rule is similarly mis-
placed, apparently relying on the primitive and outmoded notion that
taxable income only includes amounts that a corporation has "earned"
by providing services to customers.' 9 This unduly narrow notion of in-
13. See notes 8 and 9.
14. See notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the business reasons why the customer, as opposed to the corporation,
is making the investment in the asset, see note 161 and accompanying text.
16. See note 170 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
17. Thus, to view the corporation as receiving income, whether prepaid or not, is incorrect.
For exceptions to this general rule, see notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
18. See note 11. This is the basic theory allowing corporations receiving contributions for
economic development to exclude such amounts from their income. Since these corporations are
not receiving the contributions in order to provide future services to the contributors, the contri-
butions are viewed as made to the corporations for the benefit of the public at large.
19. The notion that income was required to be "earned" as a precedent to inclusion in the
tax base was articulated by the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, which held that
contributions made by the Cuban government to a railroad were excluded from income, because, in
part, those contributions were not earned by providing services to the government. See Edwards,
268 U.S. at 633 (stating that "subsidy payments taxed were not made for services rendered or to be
rendered"). For a closely analogous decision, see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
(holding that stock dividends are not income because they fall to qualify as gain derived from
capital or labor). These limiting notions of income have been rejected by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, and are generally regarded as obsolete. See, for example, Commissioner v. Glen-
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1992] NONSHAREHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS 1465
come has managed to persist in this area of the law, although courts
have recognized for some time that taxable income is a much broader
concept, embracing all accretions to wealth that the taxpayer has "real-
ized," irrespective of whether those accretions were "earned.
'20
Finally, the tax laws, while employing these inappropriate criteria,
have ignored more relevant inquiries that actually would be helpful in
determining whether the corporation receiving these various types of
contributions has realized economic income. I discuss these inquiries in
more detail later in the Article.21
This haphazard system has resulted in a regime that, as previously
discussed, seems to reach results that are generally opposite to those
that would occur if the law were imposing tax only on economic income.
I should note here that I do not claim that my proposals would achieve
a perfect measure of economic income.22 My simple approach of either
including or excluding these contributions in toto for purposes of deter-
mining a corporation's income is far too crude to capture the complex
transactions discussed in this Article. However, administrative con-
cerns2 3 and the critical need for less complexity in the tax laws24 pre-
shaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that gross income includes all realized accretions to
wealth, including windfalls and other amounts that are not earned); Graetz Taxation at 201 (cited
in note 2) (stating that "although the court has not overruled Macomber, it has confined the deci-
sion to its facts"); Harris, 39 Tex. L. Rev. at 623-24 (cited in note 2) (recognizing the narrow and
now outmoded theory of income adopted in Cuba Railroad v. Edwards, and noting the close con-
ceptual relationship between that case and Eisner v. Macomber). Nevertheless, this antiquated
notion that a taxpayer must "earn" amounts from performing services in order for those amounts
to be included in the taxpayer's income persists in this area of the law dealing with nonshareholder
contributions to capital.
20. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429-31.
21. For a discussion of some of these more relevant inquiries, see, for example, notes 86-135
and accompanying text (noting the degree of market failure and taxation of payments for eco-
nomic development), and notes 197-206 and accompanying text (noting the degree of asset appro-
priation and taxation of transaction-specific assets).
22. See notes 136-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of problems and inaccuracies
present in my proposals for taxation of payments for economic development. For a discussion of
similar problems in my proposals regarding transaction-specific assets, see notes 189-206 and ac-
companying text.
23. See notes 139-40, 210-12, and accompanying text for recognition of specific administra-
tive problems in dealing with these transactions.
24. Economists, tax professionals, government officials, and others generally agree that the
present federal income tax system is far too complex. These complexities create dead-weight social
loss, in the form of requiring the expenditure of substantial economic resources in order to comply
with overly complex rules, while also aggravating the federal deficit by reducing the level of com-
pliance with the law. For a sample of the criticisms leveled at the complexity of present tax law,
and discussions of the resulting problems, see Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Multi-Period
Projects: An Analysis of Competing Models, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1109, 1137-42 (1991); Edward J.
McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1267, 1289-91; Internal Reve-
nue Service, Income Tax Compliance Research: Net Tax Gap and Remittance Gap Estimates 8-
11 (Apr. 1990) (IRS Publication 1415, Supp. to Publication 7285); Charles E. McClure, Jr., The
Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 Tax L. Rev. 25, 26-27 (1989); James S..
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vent me from proposing a system that would be more closely tailored to
the subtleties and idiosyncrasies of every transaction in order to mea-
sure economic income with greater accuracy. Nevertheless, I believe
that, in the aggregate, my proposals represent a significant improve-
ment over present law in accurately measuring income, although imper-
fections would undoubtedly remain due to the difficulties of imposing
administrable rules on very complex economic phenomena.
B. Harmful Effects of Present Law
1. Contributions for Economic Development
The erroneous tax treatment of nonshareholder contributions to
capital raises questions concerning the fairness and economic effects of
current law. First, consider the consequences of what I believe to be the
undertaxation of contributions made for economic development, such as
contributions of property by state governments to corporations locating
factories in an area. Under present law, corporations are not taxed on
these huge contributions, which I view as creating undesirable and un-
fair distributive consequences. Under the critical, but defensible, as-
sumption that the "incidence" or economic burden of the corporate
tax25 ultimately resides with the owners or shareholders of the corpora-
tion,2 6 the shareholders are able to retain the additional wealth pro-
Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, reprinted in 45 Tax L. Rev. 7, 18-20 (1989);
Pamela Brooks Gann, What Has Happened to the Tax Legislative Process?, 86 Mich. L. Rev.
1196, 1206-08 (1988). It is extremely important, therefore, that any proposals to alter the existing
tax system consist of clear, administrable rules in order to avoid aggravating an already
overburdened regime. As a result, the proposals in this Article generally recommend an "all or
nothing" approach, under which contributions are completely included or excluded from taxable
income, as opposed to a more complex (and accurate) system that would be closely tailored to the
characteristics of particular transactions. For further discussion of this "all or nothing" approach,
see notes 139-40 210-12 and accompanying text.
25. The incidence of a tax is defined as the ultimate burden of the tax. Rosen, Public Fi-
nance at 243-66 (cited in note 4); Klein, et al., Federal Income Taxation at 27-29 (cited in note 6);
Douglas A. Kahn and Pamela B. Gann, Corporate Taxation 21-41 (West, 3d ed. 1989). Determin-
ing the incidence of a tax necessitates locating the party who ultimately suffers the burden of the
tax. Conversely, determining the effects of undertaxing these contributions requires locating the
party who ultimately enjoys the benefit of the tax's absence. For a general discussion of the diffi-
culties in determining the party who ultimately benefits from favorable tax provisions, see Bittker
and Lokken, Taxation of Income at 3.3.3 (cited in note 3).
26. In general, the corporate income tax is viewed as a progressive tax, notwithstanding the
difficulties of determining its incidence. See note 25. The tax is regarded as burdening the share-
holders of corporations who, in the aggregate, are more affluent than the population in general.
Rosen, Public Finance at 262-65 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that the incidence of corporate tax is
on the owners of the corporation or capital, which is a "progressive outcome"); Stanley S. Surrey,
Value-Added Tax: The Case Against, 48 Harv. Bus. Rev. 86, 90 (1970). But see Musgrave and
Musgrave, Public Finance at 419, 424-25 (cited in note 4) (asserting that the corporate income tax
is progressive under certain assumptions, but not necessarily under others). Therefore, since the
corporate income tax likely is progressive, a reduction of the income tax liabilities of these corpora-
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vided by the lenient taxation of these contributions. This raises serious
concerns regarding the distribution of the nation's wealth, in that the
owners of corporations receive favorable tax benefits (arguably "wind-
falls") 27 at the expense of the federal fisc and the nation's taxpayers in
general. 8 Such a result likely is regressive; wealth is transferred from a
less affluent group, the nation's taxpayers, to the more affluent corpo-
rate sector. I will assume here that most readers share my concerns re-
garding the ethical problems of regressive taxes, without dealing with
all of the complexities of such a position. 9
Moreover, the conclusion that corporations should be taxed on
these contributions is still defensible, even if one rejects the assumption
that the incidence of the corporate tax lies with the corporation's share-
holders. Corporations receiving contributions for economic development
may compete these contributions away in the marketplace 0 by lowering
tions receiving contributions for economic development likely would be viewed as regressive in'
nature. Such a conclusion assumes, however, that if additional taxes were enacted to replace those
taxes lost through this favorable treatment, those new taxes would be less progressive than the
corporate taxes that they would be intended to replace. If, in contrast, the replacement taxes were
more progressive than the corporate income tax, then the aggregate effect of this reduction in
corporate income tax would be progressive. For recognition of this point, see Rosen, Public Fi-
nance at 448.
27. Note that this equity argument only applies to shareholders of corporations who man-
aged to acquire corporate shares at lower prices that did not reflect this advantageous tax treat-
ment. If this advantageous tax treatment were fully capitalized or reflected in the price of the
corporation's shares (by increasing the price), then new shareholders purchasing those shares
would not have a windfall by virtue of this favorable tax treatment because they already would
have purchased this tax treatment when they bought the shares. Rosen, Public Finance at 266
(cited in note 4); Bittker and Lokken Taxation of Income at 3.3.3 (cited n note 3) (noting what
windfalls are obtained by investors who purchase tax advantaged assets before favorable tax treat-
ment is granted.)
28. Similar equity arguments are made by persons who generally oppose the payments by
state and local governments of contributions to corporations for economic development. (These
persons are criticizing economic development programs in general and not the federal income tax
treatment of such programs, which is generally overlooked.) These writers criticize the market for
economic development as shifting income to the corporate sector in an inequitable manner. See,
for example, Bennett Harrison and Sandra Kanter, The Political Economy of States' Job-Creation
Business Incentives, 44 AIP J. 424, 425 (Oct. 1978) (criticizing economic development programs as
causing regressive transfers of wealth to the corporate sector); Jerry Jacobs, Bidding For Business:
Corporate Auctions And The 50 Disunited States 36-37 (Public Interest Reseotrch Group, 1979)
(criticizing state and local tax abatements as "the prerogative of the wealthy and the powerful");
Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus, in
Richard D. Bingham and John P. Blair, eds., Urban Economic Development 245, 246-47 (Sage,
1984) (discussing the extraction by corporations of unnecessary concessions from state and local
governments for economic development).
29. For the classical work dealing with this general tax policy issue, see Walter J. Blum and
Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (Chicago, 1953). For a poignant expres-
sion of the issues at stake here, see Klein, et al., Federal Income Taxation at 20-22 (cited in note
6).
30. See notes 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
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the prices they charge for goods and services provided to customers.3 1
In such a situation, the likely effect of an income tax imposed on these
contributions would be to reduce the amount of the discount in prices
that the corporations provide their customers. Here, the incidence of
the corporate tax would be on the corporations' customers,32 not their
shareholders.3
In such a situation, the corporations would not have economic in-
come upon receipt of these contributions. The value of the contribu-
tions would be competed away in the marketplace as opposed to inuring
to the benefit of the corporations and their shareholders. Thus, one
could argue that corporations should receive the contributions tax-free.
Nevertheless, I would still maintain that the contributions should be
taxed. In this situation, however, allocative efficiency would make taxa-
tion desirable, as opposed to considerations of fairness.
3 4
The argument is as follows: as a result of receiving these contribu-
tions, corporations will be able to sell their goods and services to cus-
tomers at lower prices, leading to their increased consumption and a
corresponding increase in the resources allocated to that segment of the
economy. This is a nonneutral development.3 5 Corporations that can
31. For a recognition of the fact that these benefits (categorized as "rents" in the economics
literature) can be competed away by the firms receiving them, see James M. Buchanan, Rent Seek-
ing and Profit Seeking, in James Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward
a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society 6-7 (Texas A & M, 1980). For the related phenomenon of
corporations competing away such rents through providing higher quality, more costly services to
customers, see George W. Douglas and James C. Miller, III, Economic Regulation of Domestic Air
Transport: Theory and Policy 91-92, 103, 163 (Brookings Institution, 1974) (discussing airlines,
under jurisdication of Civil Aeronautics Board, competing away benefits of controlled prices by
offering higher quality services, such as noncrowded planes, to passengers).
32. See, for example, Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance Theory at 423-24 (cited in
note 4) for general analysis of such a result,
33. It is also possible that corporations would compete away these contributions by paying
higher wages to employees, or by making larger payments to their suppliers. If this were to occur,
then the effects of a tax on these contributions would be to reduce the wages or payments in
question. Thus, the incidence of the tax here would rest on the employees or suppliers of the firm.
See, for example, Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance Theory at 424 (cited in note 4) for a
discussion of the possibility that the incidence of the tax would fall on employees of the firm. Such
a scenario likely would result in a distortion of the labor or supplier market, and would present
allocative problem- similar to those discussed in the text regarding customers.
34. See note 53 for a discussion of second-best problems related to arguments for allocative
efficiency. For the argument that inefficiency and unfairness in the tax system may be mutually
exclusive problems, with each problem present to the extent that the other problem is absent, see
Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequi-
ties?, in Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin, eds., The Economics of Taxation 19 (Brookings
Inst., 1980); Shaviro, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1224-25 (cited in note 7).
35. Admittedly, these contributions might be justified as a deliberate subsidy to capital that
would help increase the rate of savings in the nation and otherwise facilitate capital formation.
However, it would be difficult to justify these ad hoc and inadvertent subsidies to capital, espe-
cially in comparison with available alternative arrangments that would provide subsidies to capital
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move (or threaten to move) their facilities from one locale to another
can extract concessions from state and local governments that provide
them with a competitive advantage over corporations that are unable to
extract these concessions. 6 These concessions, in turn, distort the allo-
cation of resources through price and market mechanisms.3 7 I am not
claiming here that all market advantages obtained by firms as a result
of competition between local governments for economic development
(including competition involving local taxes) create economic inefficien-
cies.3s However, these special "deals," obtained by only certain corpora-
on an ordered and principled basis. As an example of thoughtful and careful proposals to provide
subsidies to capital in a more defensible manner, see David F. Bradford, Tax Neutrality and the
Invebtment Tax Credit, in Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin, eds., The Economics of Taxa-
tion 281 (Brookings Inst., 1980); Arnold C. Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives,
in The Economics of Taxation 299. For a general discussion of such tax subsidies to capital, see
the assortment of views contained in William A. Klein, Policy Analysis of the Federal Income Tax
457-528 (Foundation, 1976).
36. Admittedly, allowing these contributions to be exempt from federal tax might be defensi-
ble if exemptions were used to attract foreign investment that would not otherwise be invested in
this country. However, present law is not restricted to such a narrow application, and, therefore,
cannot be defended by such an argument. Moreover, there are considerable doubts regarding the
effectiveness of such incentives in luring foreign corporations to invest in the United States. See,
for example, the comments of Professor Susan Tolchin, a co-author of a leading book in this area,
who criticizes state and local governments for wasting resources on recruiting these firms by noting
that "[i]t's clear to me that after several years of study that the foreign multi-nationals locating
here would do so with or without the incentives," quoted in Pamela Gaynor, Incentive Race
Among States is Cooling Off, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette § 1 at 29 (March 4, 1991). For more discus-
sion of this issue, see Martin Tolchin and Susan Tolchin, Buying into America 64-67 (Times
Books, 1988).
37. The effect of these concessions on resource allocation is undesirable because it does not
reflect differences in operating efficiencies or other natural cost advantages possessed by mobile
capital. Instead, the concessions are more likely to reflect the ability of certain corporations to
exploit strategic advantages available to them in the market for economic development. See notes
92-135 and accompanying text. Thus, the increased allocation of resources towards economic sec-
tors represented by these corporations is not an efficient adaption of the market. On the other
hand, this argument may be undercut to the extent that people living in areas that actually obtain
economic development place more value on that development than those living in different areas.
In such a situation, the firm settling in the area would produce a net efficiency gain. This gain
would offset the efficiency loss resulting from the interference with market mechanisms. See notes
141-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
38. For example, to the extent that a particular state or local government is able to provide
services in a low-cost, efficient manner to its citizens, local taxes in that jurisdiction will be low in
relation to government services received. Firms operating in this area might have competitive ad-
vantages orer firms located in other areas. This competitive advantage would be allocatively desir-
able, in that it would result in more pressure on other jurisdications to adopt similarly efficient
government programs. For support of such an argument, see Charles E. McClure, Tax Competi-
tion: Is What's Good For the Private Goose Also Good for the Public Gander? 39 Nat'l. Tax J. 341
(1986). Contrast Andrew Reschovsky, How Closely Does State and Local Government Behavior
Conform to a Perfectly Competitive Model?, in Daphne Kenyon and John Kincaid, eds., Competi-
tion Among States and Local Governments 147, 148-49 (Urban Inst., 1991) (criticizing certain
factual assumptions made by McClure and the resulting conclusions drawn from those assump-
tions). For a criticism of certain types of competition between states that result in firms settling in
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tions in the market for economic development, undoubtedly distort
market mechanisms in peculiar ways that cannot be defended by ap-
pealing to the salutary benefits of competition.3 9 My proposals to tax
firms upon receipt of these contributions would reduce the net benefit
6f these contributions, which in turn would limit the ability of these
firms to reduce their prices and alter the allocation of resources. Thus,
the negative allocative effects of these special concessions would be
reduced.
Finally, irrespective of one's views regarding the incidence of the
corporate income tax, I would argue that taxing these contributions
reduces the dead-weight social loss incurred by "rent seeking"40 in the
market for economic development.41 Corporations incur substantial ad-
ministrative costs in the process of attracting, receiving, and evaluating
bids ("rents") from state and local governments to locate in particular
areas.42 Similarly, state and local governments also incur substantial
costs participating in this process. 43 Taxing corporations upon their re-
ceipt of these contributions would reduce the amount of net rents avail-
able for private parties in this market and would therefore reduce the
incentives parties would have to seek out these rents. As a result, the
high-cost, inefficient areas, see Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in
Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 900-03 (1992). For a similar criticism on the grounds that such
competition results in drastic underfunding of badly needed social programs, see Harold A. Hovey,
Interstate Tax Competition and Economic Development, in Steven D. Gould, ed., Reforming
State Tax Systems 89, 97 (Nat'l Conf. of State Legis., 1986). For an assortment of various views
on the benefits of tax competition among states, see generally Competition Among State and Lo-
cal Governments (Nat'l. Conf. State Legis., 1991).
39. See notes 37-38.
40. I use the term "rent seeking" here to describe "profit seeking" activities by persons in
institutional settings in which exploitation of political structures presents opportunities for gain.
See Buchanan, Profit Seeking, in Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society at 3-4 (cited in
note 31). In the specific context of this Article, the term "rent seeking" refers to efforts of persons
to obtain grants and other benefits from government for economic development. See, for example,
Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 229-46 (Cambridge, 1989) (describing the entire federal
budget as constituting "rent" since the entire budget is "up for grabs" to rent seeking groups and
individuals). For a more technical definition of the term "rents," used in a different context, see
note 197.
41. For recognition of the dead-weight social loss and waste created by the efforts of people
to obtain rents, see Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking As A Negative Sum Game, in James Buchanan,
Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society 16-36
(Texas A & M, 1980). For accounts of the considerable time and resources devoted by companies
in dealing with these various state development associations, see, Robert W. Schmenner, Making
Business Location Decisions 68, 70, 79 (Prentice-Hall, 1982).
. 42. For accounts of the considerable time and resources devoted by companies with these
various state development associations, see id.
43. For a discussion of the substantial resources spent by state and local governments in this
process, see Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying Into America at 52-54 (cited in note 36). See also
Daphne A. Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competition: Good or Bad for the Federal
System? 52 (Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, 1991).
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amount of administrative costs incurred by corporations and govern-
ments in this market would be reduced, which would be a desirable
development.
44
2. Contributions of Transaction-Specific Assets
Next, consider the consequences of overtaxing (i.e., imposing a tax
in the absence of economic income) contributions of specialized assets
(transaction-specific assets) received by corporations from customers.
Many (but certainly not all)45 of these particular contributions are re-
ceived by regulated public utilities46 whose prices charged to customers
for services are determined by various regulatory authorities pursuant
to specific formulas. 7 Consider again the individual homeowner who
moves to a house in a rural area and contributes to a water utility the
costs of extending a water line to the homeowner's residence. Present
law requires the utility to include the value of this transaction-specific
asset in its taxable income, thus immediately increasing its tax liability.
Practices adopted by most regulatory authorities allow the utility to re-
spond to this taxation by simply requiring the customer to make a
larger initial contribution, which covers not only the costs of installing
the water line, but also includes amounts for the taxes that the utility
itself will pay to the federal government.4' Thus, as a result of tax law,
44. Note that this argument for taxation applies in situations in which corporations might
not have economic income from receiving the contributions. For example, corporations might incur
such substantial administrative costs in the rent seeking activities that the costs incurred would
effectively offset the rents received, leaving the corporations no better off than before the rent
seeking activity took place. Mueller, Public Choice II at 231 (cited in note 40). Nevertheless, al-
though the rents received would not represent economic income to the corporation, they should be
taxed simply to reduce the incentives for such rent seeking activities.
45. For a discussion of these types of contributions occurring in nonregulated market envi-
ronments outside of the public utility area, see notes 156-58 and 222-23. To the extent that the
overtaxation of these contributions occurs in a nonregulated environment, then all of the difficul-
ties of determining the incidence of this tax, and hence its ultimate effect, are fully applicable. For
a discussion of these problems, see note 25.
46. This problem of overtaxation occurs in contributions in aid of construction, which involve
the contribution of transaction-specific assets to regulated public utilities by their customers. See
note 8. This Article's proposals, however, apply to all contributions of transaction-specific assets,
regardless of whether the recipient corporation is regulated. See notes 222-23 and accompanying
text. Thus, the discussion in the text would not apply to all types of transactions that are covered
under this Article's proposals.
47. For a discussion of how public utilities determine the prices they charge to customers, see
notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
48. This treatment which, in effect, requires the contributor to indemnify the utility for the
taxes the utility is required to pay on the contribution, has been adopted by most regulatory au-
thorities. See, for example, California Public Utilities Commission, Re: Tax Reform Act of 1986, 86
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 519 (1987) (authorizing the utilities to charge contributors for taxes imposed
on the transactions); Missouri Public Service Commission, Re: St. Louis County Water Company,
79 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 581 (1987); Vermont Public Service Board, Glidden v. Central Vermont
Public Service Corporation, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 142 (1990); Price Waterhouse, The Tax As-
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the costs of installing the water line have significantly increased" to the
homeowner."
These increased costs resulting from the overtaxation of transac-
tion-specific assets may create a number of problems. Evidence indi-
cates, for example, that these tax rules are interfering with attempts to
construct new water and sewage treatment facilities, including facilities
constructed in order to reduce pollution and alleviate other environ-
mental problems." Similarly, these tax rules may be placing excessive
pects of Contributions In Aid of Construction 9 (Price Waterhouse, 1991) (stating that the public
utility commissions have generally followed the principle that the contributor should be responsi-
ble for paying the tax on the contribution received by the utility). A minority of regulatory com-
missions may instead charge all of the utility's customers for the additional taxes paid by the
utility, as opposed to charging only the persons actually making the contribution that results in
the tax. See, for example, Idaho PUC Adopts New Tax Policy on Contribution in Aid of Con-
struction, Electric Utility Week 16 (June 27, 1988) (discussing proposals adopted by Idaho Public
Utilities Commission that, in effect, charge all of the utility's customers for the taxes created by
these contributions, as opposed to charging only the person making the contribution).
49. For a discussion of this point, with an estimate that this tax treatment has increased the
average cost of a home by $1500 to $2000, see New Federal Tax Regulations Add to the Cost of a
House, Chicago Tribune at N18 (July 23, 1988); Bruce Keppel, Paying Your Taxes; Developers
Shoulder New Tax on Utilities-For Now, L.A. Times at 67 (Mar. 15, 1987) (Home edition). As a
caveat, these estimates of increases in home prices are being supplied by groups that are opposed
to the taxation of these transactions, and thus have every incentive to portray these taxes as very
burdensome. Notwithstanding the bias of these sources, this tax treatment is clearly increasing the
prices of homes, although the amount of the increase is less certain.
50. For a general discussion of the problem of determining the gross amount of a payment in
order to leave a certain net amount remaining after taxes, see Graetz Taxation at 114-15 (cited in
note 2). To illustrate how this process occurs using the example in the text, assume that the cost of
the water line (excluding the taxes paid by the utility), is $1000, and assume that the utility is
subject to a marginal tax rate of 34%. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (West 1992). Under one methodology that
sometimes is used by utilities, the contributor will be required to pay $1515 to the utility ($1000
for the water line and $515 for taxes), thus increasing the amount of the contribution by over 50%.
For an example of a regulatory commission adopting this methodology, see California Public Utili-
ties Commission, 86 Pub. Util. Rep. at 524, 553 (cited in note 48) (adopting this methodology,
termed "method 2," to small water companies and small telephone companies in California). How-
ever, continuing with this same example, regulatory commissions may require other utilities to
reduce the amount of the contribution to a figure below $1515, to reflect the federal income tax
benefits that the utility will obtain over time from depreciation deductions the utility is allowed to
take with respect to the $1000 invested in the water line. I.R.C. § 168. (The utility is deemed to be
the owner of this water line for federal income tax purposes, and thus is allowed to depreciate the
water line.) In such a situation, the contribution being required of the homeowner will still be
substantial, although the contribution will be less than $1515. For an example of this methodology
producing a total contribution of $1273, as opposed to a contribution of $1515, see California Pub-
lic Utilities Commission, 86 Pub. Util. Rep. at 553, 556-59 (cited in note 48) (adopting and explain-
ing the' use of this methodology, termed "method 5," to all California utilities excluding small
water companies and small telephone companies).
51. For example, private letter rulings issued by the IRS confirm that these tax provisions
are burdening projects of this nature. See, for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8910025 (Dec. 8, 1988), in
which a town contributed water mains to a utility in an effort to deal with problems created by
groundwater pollution contaminating private wells in the area. The IRS ruled that the utility was
taxable on the receipt of the water main. The utility, in turn, required additional payment from
the town to indemnify the utility for this tax liability. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9040021 (July 5,
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burdens on efforts to construct or relocate roads, water and electric dis-
tribution systems, traffic lights, and other safety-oriented improve-
ments.5 2 Thus, the overtaxation of these transactions raises concerns
that economic resources are being diverted from particular sectors of
the economy, resulting in allocations of resources that may be ineffi-
cient. 3 Whether allocatively inefficient results are definitely occurring
is uncertain.5" However, the risk that such outcomes are developing is
sufficiently serious to warrant further consideration of this problem.
1990) (ruling that a utility was taxable on the receipt of new water and sewage facilities con-
structed to accommodate the needs of a subdivision in the area); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8909019 (Dec. 2,
1988) (ruling that a utility was taxable on the receipt of water mains constructed by a town in
order to extend water service to areas previously without service). For a discussion of the negative
impact of these tax rules on the ability of companies to comply with various environmental safe-
guards, see James B. Groff, The Water Supply Industry Faces the Impact of New Federal Rules,
123 Pub. Util. Fortnightly 18 (Jan. 19, 1989). See also statement of Senator H. Reid (D. Nev.), a
sponsor of legislation to amend these tax rules, regarding the negative effects of this tax treatment
on efforts to improve the quality of drinking water by upgrading water treatment facilities, printed
in 137 Cong. Rec. S. 8811, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 26, 1991); Statement of Representative Peter
Visclosky (D. Ind.), on the detrimental effect these tax rules have had on an environmental con-
tamination problem occurring in Indiana, reprinted in Tax Notes Today (Mar. 9, 1990); Statement
of Malcolm H. McLetchie on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute for the House Committee on
Ways & Means, U.S. 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 490-94 (Mar. 5, 1990). The nongovernmental sources
cited here are opposed to the tax treatment of these contributions, and therefore should not be
viewed necessarily as providing unbiased or completely objective evidence. Nevertheless, the IRS
rulings discussed here corroborate these claims, and suggest that this tax treatment is indeed hav-
ing an undesirable effect in many areas.
52. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9035023 (May 31, 1990), (ruling that a utility was taxable on amounts
received from a local government to construct a traffic signal system); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8723023
(March 6, 1987) (holding that a utility was taxable on electrical facilities constructed in order to
provide alternative electricity services to a medical center in the event of failure of the primary
system). cee also Statement of Malcolm H. McLetchie on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute
(cited in note 51).
53. Admittedly, although the allocation of resources may be affected by this tax treatment,
one cannot necessarily claim that the resulting consequences are economically inefficient. Due to
other underlying inefficiencies in the economy, the overtaxation of contributions involving transac-
tion-specific assets may actually improve overall resource allocation in the nation. Phrased more
broadly, because we live in a "second best world," the allocative effects of overtaxing these types of
transactions cannot be evaluated in isolation, because of their interaction with other phenomena
that themselves produce allocative effects. See generally R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956). For recent recognition of second
best complications in formulating tax policy, see Shaviro, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1218-20 (cited in
note 7); George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1179,
1183 n.14 (1987). For specific proposals to recognize and deal with second best effects when setting
policy, see Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our
Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to
the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 950.
54. As previously mentioned, second best problems prevent one from confidently asserting
that a particular tax creates economic inefficiencies, unless the matter has been studied carefully.
See note 53. For example, although the overtaxation of transaction-specific assets may increase the
price of housing, see note 49 and accompanying text, it may be that we already have an overinvest-
ment in housing occurring in the United States, due, in part, to the favorable income tax treatment
of home mortgage interest. For support for the proposition that the United States may have an
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III. CONTRIBUTIONS INVOLVING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. Background and Description
State and local governments have developed extensive programs to
promote economic development by providing contributions to firms lo-
cating in their areas. Under these programs, firms receive a variety of
benefits,56 such as free property (e.g., land, buildings), employee job
training, low-interest rate loans, and relief from local taxes,57 such as
exemption of a firm from property taxes for a number of years." More-
overinvestment in housing, see Lawrence H. Goulder and Philippe Thaimann, Approaches to Effi-
cient Capital Taxation: Leveling the Playing Field v. Living by the Golden Rule (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3559, 1991). As a result, an increase in the price of
housing caused by the overtaxation of these types of contributions might, in actuality, improve the
allocation of resources by serving to dampen investment in this sector. A similar second best analy-
sis might be applied to the effect of this tax treatment on the consumption of utility services. The
increase in the price of utility services resulting from the overtaxation of transaction-specific assets
might actually improve the allocation of resources if the utilities in question are creating environ-
mental problems by burning fossil fuels and the full cost of these problems is not otherwise re-
flected in the prices they charge for their services. Harold M. Hubbard, The Real Cost of Energy,
Scientific Am. 36 (Apr. 1991). These points are not intended to analyze fully the second best
problems connected with this Article's proposals. Rather, the reader should acknowledge that com-
plexities exist, beyond the scope of this Article, inherent in any discussion of the economic effects
caused by particular tax provisions.
55. Although the majority of these transactions involve payments by governments and com-
munity groups, payments by private parties to induce economic development in an area are also
excluded from the recipient's income. See, for example, May Dep't Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. 1128 (1974); Federated Dep't Stores v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1970). In
these cases, developers contributed land to corporations operating retail stores, in the hopes that
development of the land by the corporations would increase the value of neighboring properties
owned by the retailers. For reasons similar to those underlying the treatment of contributions by
governments, the corporations were held not to have recognized gross income from these contribu-
tions. My proposals to tax corporations on payments for economic development would apply fully
to these cases involving private parties.
56. For an extensive list of the various types of incentives offered to firms, see John C. Gray
and Dean A. Spina, State and Local Industrial Location Incentives-A Well-Stocked Candy
Store, 5 J. Corp. L. 517 (1980). For specific examples of incentive packages offered to particular
firms, see Cynthia Crossley, et al., Daviess Selected for $500 Million Scott Paper Mill, Courier-
Journal Al (Nov. 20, 1990) (reporting that incentives offered by Kentucky governments for paper
mill included road and infrastructure improvements, low-interest rate loans, job training, reloca-
tion assistance for firm's employees, and extension of utility water line); Robert Guskind, The
Giveaway Game Continues, 56 Planning 4 (Feb. 1990) (stating that incentives offered to Sears &
Roebuck by Illinois included highway improvement, utility infrastructure development, tax abate-
ments, job training, interest-free loans, and a large quantity of free land donated by a private
firm).
57. Frequently, these tax abatements are provided through the state creating an enterprise
zone in which the firm locates. For a typical example, see Nancy S. Lind and Ann. H. Elder, Who
Pays? Who Benefits? The Case of the Incentive Package Offered to the Diamond-Star Automotive
Plant, 3 Gov't Fin. Rev. 19, 21 (1986) (discussing tax benefits and other incentives to be delivered
through firm locating in enterprise zone).
58. Under my proposals, the federal government would tax all of these benefits including, for
example, state and local tax benefits provided to a firm. The federal income tax treatment of a
firm receiving an exemption from state or local taxes (such as property taxes or state income taxes)
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over, the amounts of these contributions are quite substantial, both in
the aggregate 59 and at the level of the individual firm. Toyota's receipt
of $325 million from Kentucky 0 as an inducement for locating a manu-
facturing plant, and Sears & Roebuck Co.'s receipt of $170 million from
Illinois in return for the company retaining its corporate headquarters
in the state," illustrate the magnitude of the amounts that are fre-
quently involved. Other examples of large contributions abound, includ-
ing some that are quite recent.6 2 In fact, it is now considered to be
presents certain technical difficulties. Assume, for example, that a firm receives a ten-year exemp-
tion from property taxes. (After the 10-year period in which the firm pays no property taxes, the
firm will begin paying property taxes at full rates applicable to all taxpayers.) I believe that such a
firm has an immediate accretion to wealth that should be currently included in the firm's income
for federal income tax purposes. The firm's wealth has been increased by the discounted present
value of the 10-year stream of payments which the firm has been forgiven. (For a discussion of
present value concepts, and how this amount would be determined, see Richard A. Brealey and
Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 10-15 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 1988)). This treat-
ment is appropriate because the firm's value has increased by this discounted present value figure,
in comparison with the firm's value in a situation in which a tax exemption had not been granted.
(For analogous treatment, see I.R.C. § 7872(b) (West 1992), and its treatment of term loans bear-
ing interest at a below-market rate.) This amount initially included in the firm's income would be
viewed as an asset of the firm, which would decline in value as the 10-year period passed and the
firm approached the point at which it will begin to pay taxes. (At this latter point, this asset of the
firm would have no value.) The annual decline in the value of the asset over the 10-year period
would result, for each year, in an expense for that year that would be deductible for federal income
tax purposes. For a discussion of how this annual decline in value would be computed using con-
cepts of economic depreciation, see Bittker and Lokken, Taxation of Income at 23.1.4 (cited in
note 3); Johnson, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 1039-53 (cited in note 6) ("Samuelson" depreciation).
59. For an estimate that $30 billion a year is provided to firms as contributions for economic
development, see Haider, Chi. Trib. at C25 (cited in note 1). Admittedly, the amount of these
contributions made each year to corporations is uncertain, largely because of problems in accumu-
lating this information from state budgets and other available sources. For a discussion of the lack
of aggregate information on the size of these programs, see Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying into
America at 66 (cited in note 36). See also notes 123-26. For another, very rough estimate that the
amount of these benefits in 1986 was equal to $11.6 billion, see Dick Netzer, An Evaluation of
Interjurisdictional Competition Through Economic Development Incentives, in Daphne Kenyon
and John Kincaid, eds., Competition Among States and Local Governments 242 & n.1 (Urban
Inst., 1991).
60. Norman J. Glickman and Douglas P. Woodward, The New Competitors 230 (Basic
Books, 1989). Other sources have estimated that the contributions offered to Toyota may exceed
this figure. See, for example, Roland Klose, Incentives Offered by States to Attract Businesses
Draw Challenges, 8 Memphis Bus. J. § 1 at 16 (May 18, 1987) (citing sources that state the contri-
butions made to Toyota may exceed $394 million).
61. Guskind, 56 Planning at 4 (cited in note 56); Long Hwa-Shu, What it Took to Convince
Sears to Stay in Illinois, N.Y. Times § 8 at 1 (July 23, 1989) (quoting "experts" as stating that the
total value of contributions made to Sears exceeded $170 million).
62. For a sample of local stories regarding contributions offered to particular firms regarding
specific locations, see, for example, Richard W. Stevenson, 9 Towns Spare No Effort to Snare New
Plant, N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 18, 1991) (discussing the heated competition for a McDonnell Douglas
Plant involving hundreds of millions of dollars in incentives); Bob Merrifield and Martin Zabell,
Will County Hopes to Lure Bears with Romeoville Stadium Plan, Chi. Trib. C3 (June 14, 1991)
(discussing the incentives offered to the Chicago Bears professional football team considering a
new stadium location); Barbara Deters, BofA Could Get Millions as Lure to Utilize Center in
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standard procedure for state and local governments63 to offer "incen-
tive" packages featuring these contributions to firms that are consider-
ing the establishment of a facility in their area."
B. Rationale for Taxation
The simple rationale for taxation of these contributions is that cor-
porations have received free property or other privileges" of significant
value, thus immediately experiencing an increase in their wealth that
should be subject to tax. Through these subsidies provided by state and
local governments, corporations are able to acquire factories, corporate
headquarters, and other facilities at a cost that is substantially below
their value. "Under a Haig-Simons income tax, such accretions to wealth
would be immediately taxed as they occur.6
To illustrate this point in a different manner, assume a corporation
has decided to construct a factory to produce consumer products that
the corporation will sell in the marketplace. Also, assume that the cor-
poration would normally earn a ten percent annual return on invest-
ments of this kind.
Now, assume that the factory is able to obtain $1 million from a
state government as an inducement to locate its factory in a particular
area. This $1 million effectively reduces the amount of capital the cor-
State, The Arizona Republic F4 (Mar. 17, 1991) (reporting that $16.3 million in incentives was
accepted by BankAmerica Corporation from Phoenix and the State of Arizona to lure company to
Phoenix); Gaynor, Incentive Race Among States Is Cooling Off, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette § 1 at 29
(cited in note 36) (reporting that a $40 million incentive package was offered to Sony Corp. to
locate plants in Pennsylvania); Brian R. Ball, Fisher Guide Plans $54 Million Upgrade, Business
First-Columbus § 1 at 1 (Jan. 22, 1990) (reporting that local tax abatements were planned as in-
centives for installations of new equipment at an existing plant). For discussion of the general
significance and extent of these incentive programs, see Gray and Spina, 5 J. Corp. L. at 517 (cited
in note 56); Heather A. Hatfield, Steven W. Setzer, and F. Housley Carr, Politics Triumph in
State Bid Wars For Plum Projects: Push is on for More Rational Approach, Engineering News-
Record 18 (Sept. 18, 1987); Robert Guskind, Games Cities Play, 21 Nat'l J. 634 (Mar. 18, 1989);
The States; Taking Care of Business, The Economist 28 (Feb. 18, 1989). For information regard-
ing the huge incentives offered, to foreign firms in particular, as inducements to locate plants in
the United States, see Glickman and Woodward, The New Competitors at 225-54 (cited in note
60); Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying Into AmeriCa at 49-67, 308-14 (cited in note 36).
63. Moreover, local community groups (such as business federations) also play a significant
role in arranging and financing these incentive packages to entice firms to locate in the area. See,
for example, Stephen Franklin, Japan Finds Niche in Midwest; Job-hungry Towns Work Hard to
Lure New Employers, Chi. Trib. at Cl (Sept. 17, 1990) (discussing the efforts of the Illinois Valley
Area Chamber of Commerce to entice Japanese firms to the state).
64. The States: Taking Care of Business, The Economist at 28 (stating that "today, there is
hardly a state that does not practise some form of business seduction"); Hatfield, Setzer, and Carr,
Engineering News-Record at 18 (stating that "[n]ow, every state has some form of incentive pack-
age for economic development"); Gray and Spina, 5 J. Corp. L. at 521 (cited in note 55) (discussing
the "'explosion' in the number of industrial incentives created in the past few years").
65. Such privileges would include, for example, exemption from local taxes. See note 58.
66. See note 7 for discussion of such a tax.
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poration is required to invest in the factory. Since, however, the posi-
tive cash flows from future sales of the factory's products remain the
same, the rate of return the corporation will earn on its investment of
capital has increased. As a result of the $1 million contribution, let us
say that the rate of return has increased two percent, i.e., the corpora-
tion is now anticipating earning a twelve percent annual rate of return
on its investment. The corporation has now obtained an asset that pro-
vides an extraordinary rate of return, in excess of other rates of return
available in the marketplace (adjusting for differences in risk). This re-
sults in the corporation having an immediate accretion to its wealth
equal to the discounted present value of the premium return, i.e., two
percent (twelve percent less ten percent) that will be provided by the
factory over its life.6 7 The firm will achieve the normal ten percent re-
turn over the life of the plant and properly will be taxed in later years
as the ten percent return is received.
Normally, intractable administrative difficulties prevent the tax
system from immediately taxing firms which obtain projects that pro-
vide extraordinary rates of return. Instead, the tax laws allow firms to
defer recognizing such returns until they are actually received in later
years. In this situation, however, there is an administrable and simple
manner of determining the present value of that portion of the return
that is extraordinary and that immediately should be included in in-
come. It is $1 million, the amount of the contribution received by the
corporation. Under my proposals, the corporation would be immedi-
ately taxed on this amount.
C. Contributions in a Competitive Market
1. The Lack of Economic Income
My thesis that corporations have income from these contributions
largely depends on the argument that significant market failure exists,9
in the market for economic development. In contrast, in a perfectly
competitive market,70 these firms would not recognize economic income
67. See Strnad, 99 Yale L. J. at 1825-26 (cited in note 7).
68. See id. at 1901-02 (cited in note 7) (noting the administrative difficulties of making fre-
quent assessments of market values of assets that are not publicly traded). See also Evans, 69 Tex.
L. Rev. at 1151-52 (cited in note 24), for a discussion of problems connected with such extraordi-
nary rates of return. For recognition of the general phenomenon of extraordinary rates resulting in
immediate economic income, see Brealey and Meyers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 64 (cited
in note 58).
69. By market failure, I mean the failure of an economic system to produce outcomes that
represent an efficient allocation of resources. See Rosen, Public Finance at 61 (cited in note 4);
Martin Bronfenbrenner, Werner Sichel, and Wayland Gardner, Economics 653 (Houghton Mifflin,
2d ed. 1987).
70. Perfect competition exists in situations in which there are exchanges of standardized
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from participating in these transactions. To illustrate this point, con-
sider a firm that has decided to construct a factory and is deciding
where to locate the factory. Generally, firms evaluate locations based on
an assessment of an area's "natural" characteristics, such as access to
customers and suppliers, costs of labor, transportation, and energy, and
"quality of life. 7 1
Furthermore, assume that the search for a location by the firm
takes place in a perfectly competitive market. Such a competitive mar-
ketplace would be characterized by large numbers of buyers (local gov-
ernments and community groups) and sellers (firms), with all parties
having perfect information, and with the goods being sold (economic
development) of a standardized nature.7 2 Thus, firms would know pre-
cisely which areas possessed natural advantages in terms of proximity
to customers and suppliers, and inexpensive operating costs. Moreover,
all buyers, such as local governments, would also have this information
regarding the natural attractions provided to each firm by various
locations.
In such perfect competition, a firm would settle in the area possess-
ing the most natural advantages, unless governments of other less desir-
able areas offered additional incentives that at least offset the
advantages possessed by the more desirable area. For example, assume
that a firm finds that Location I possesses the most natural advantages
for a planned factory. Location II, a less desirable area in that it im-
poses higher costs or provides a lower return, is the firm's second
choice. Assume that the firm, possessing perfect information, deter-
mines that Location I's advantages over Location II's are equivalent, in
monetary terms, to a lump sum payment of $1 million. Since all parties
possess perfect information, local governments in both locations would
also be aware of this fact. Assume, furthermore, that Location II, the
less desirable alternative, provides a contribution of $1 million to the
firm as an inducement to locate the factory in that area.
If the firm accepts this offer from Location II, then the firm's ac-
tual accretion to wealth from receiving the contribution and moving to
Location II is zero.73 The $1 million received by the firm is not an ac-
goods among numerous buyers and sellers, with those buyers and sellers having complete informa-
tion and knowledge regarding the nature of the goods, their accessibility, and all other relevant
data. Samuelson, Economics at 61-62 (cited in note 4).
71. Gray and Spina, 5 J. Corp. L. at 522-24 (cited in note 56); Barry M. Rubin and C. Kurt
Zorn, Sensible State and Local Economic Development, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 333, 334 (1985);
Schmenner, Making Business Location Decisions at 37-38 (cited in note 41).
72. See note 70.
73. Under a state of perfect competition, a firm could not plausibly have an accretion to
wealth merely by moving into an area possessing tremendous natural advantages. If such an area
existed, firms would compete with each other and would make payments to local governments in
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cretion to the firm's wealth, and should not be included in the firm's
taxable income. (Similarly, since the $1 million is not included in the
firm's income, the firm should not receive any tax "basis" from this
amount.) 4 Rather, the $1 million payment serves to compensate the
firm for accepting a location that is naturally inferior to Location I.
Thus, the $1 million serves as an offset to the real decrease in wealth
that the firm experiences by moving to Location II, rather than Loca-
tion I.
This result also can be illustrated by reference to the previous ex-
ample in which the market annual rate of return was equal to ten per-
cent. By establishing its factory in Location II, the firm has invested its
capital in a location that will provide a subnormal rate of return of, for
example, eight percent. The $1 million payment reduces the amount of
the firm's capital investment and raises the rate of return to ten per-
cent, which allows it to earn the normal market rate of return from the
factory. This normal market rate of return will be taxed, over time, as
the factory generates income for the firm. No tax should be immedi-
ately imposed, however, because no immediate accretion to the firm's
wealth has occurred. The contribution received by the firm simply re-
sults in the firm earning a normal rate of return from its net capital
investment, not an extraordinary return. In other words, the $1 million
payment prevents the firm from having a net investment in the factory
that exceeds the factory's fair market value.
Some readers may object to this conclusion and argue that even in
this situation, the firm should be taxed currently on the $1 million it
receives as an inducement to settle in Location II, the inferior location.
These readers may argue for taxation on the grounds that the $1 mil-
lion payment serves as a substitute for future income that would be
taxed to the firm.78 I believe that this argument is fundamentally flawed
because it fails to view the situation in the correct manner.
order to be allowed to locate in the area. (Governments could control entry into the area by zoning
and permit regulations.) Such payments would offset the natural advantages of the area, and result
in the firms having no accretion to wealth from moving into the area. In fact, such a system exists
in many areas where local authorities impose "impact fees" on real estate developers as a price for
allowing the developers to build in an area. For a discussion of these impact fees and various legal
challenges to their imposition, see John M. Payne, Development Fee Developments, 17 Real Est.
L. J. 71 (1988).
74. For support of this zero-basis rule, see Calvin H. Johnson, The Legitimacy of Basis From
A Corporation's Own Stock, 9 Am. J. Tax Pol. 155, 179-81, 185-87 (1991).
75. For recognition of this problem generally, see Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. at 631 (cited in note
2); Sneed, 17 Stan. L. Rev. at 608 (cited in note 2).
76. This rationale is generally used to defend the taxation of "carved out" or temporal inter-
ests in property, by which one party sells future income streams from property to another person,
and receives an immediate cash payment in the sale. Since the amounts immediately received by
the seller of the carved-out interest serve as a substitute for future income the seller would other-
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The firm that accepts $1 million from Location II as a reduction in
the cost of its factory is in a similar position as an investor who
purchases a bond, and immediately afterwards sells the right to receive
future interest income on the bond to another party for a lump-sum
cash payment. The investor does not have economic income from the
receipt of the cash because the amount of the cash received is equal to
the fair market value of what the investor has sold, i.e., the net present
value of the future cash flows that the bond will generate. The tax laws
recognize the validity of this point by treating the investor as recogniz-
ing no net taxable income from selling the bond interest for the cash
payment.
7 7
The firm receiving $1 million from Location II to locate in a less
desirable place is. essentially giving up its right to receive future cash
flows, which have a net present value of $1 million, from a more desira-
ble location.78 In return for the loss of future cash flow, the firm re-
ceives a lump-sum cash payment that equals the present value of what
the firm has lost. Thus, the firm does not have economic income from
the receipt of the $1 million cash. The $1 million cash simply reduces
the amount of the firm's investment in the factory, so that the firm's
remaining investment in the factory equals the factory's fair market
value. Without the $1 million cash payment, constructing a factory
would cost the firm $1 million more than the factory's fair market
value. The $1 million payment simply serves to equalize these two fac-
tors. Such a result, taken in the overall context of the firm deciding to
locate the factory in the less desirable area, does not result in economic
income.
2. The Consistency of this Model with Perfect Competition
This scenario is consistent with the conditions present in a per-
fectly competitive market. Location II would not necessarily contribute
wise receive, the amounts are included in the seller's income. See, for example, Hort v. Commis-
sioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), and the discussion of Hort in Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic of Tax 254-
56 (West, 1989).
77. The rules for "stripped bonds" in I.R.C. § 1286 (West 1992), allow a person selling bond
interest to allocate basis to the sold interest based on the proportion of the fair market value being
sold. (That is, if the interest being sold represents 40% of the total value of the bond, then 40% of
the bond's basis will be allocated to the sold interest). Since the aggregate fair market value and
basis of a newly purchased bond will be equal, an investor immediately selling the bond interest
will recognize no gain from the sale (i.e., the amount received from the sale will be offset exactly by
the basis allocated to the sold interest, resulting in a gain of zero). For recognition of the theoreti-
cal superiority of this stripped bond approach to the alternative approach adopted by the Supreme
Court in Hort v. Commissioner, see Dodge, The Logic of Tax at 262-63 (cited in note 76).
78. Future cash flows may be reduced through higher operating costs imposed on the firm in




any more than the $1 million to the firm, since it has perfect informa-
tion regarding the relative attractions of the two areas, and knows ex-
actly how much it must offer to compensate the firm 'for its natural
disadvantages vis-A-vis Location I. Similarly, Location I would have no
incentive to offer contributions that would offset the effects of Location
II's offer, since an abundance of firms are in the market. 9 For Location
I to offer a premium to entice sufficient firms to its area would therefore
be unnecessary.
Moreover, such a result is consistent with theories regarding per-
fectly competitive markets in equilibrium, which provide that sellers of
goods do not earn any economic "profits" from sales.8 0 Instead, sellers
compete such profits away as they are forced to sell goods at prices
equal to marginal cost in order to compete with other sellers. 1 The con-
clusion that firms receive no economic profits from selling positive ex-
ternalities generated by their factories is consistent with these
theoretical results. The marginal cost to the firm of its externalities is
zero;82 thus, in competitive equilibrium and perfect competition, the
firm would receive nothing from selling these externalities. 3 Conse-
quently, in a perfectly competitive situation, taxing these types of non-
shareholder contributions would be inappropriate since the
contributions would not represent accretions to the firm's wealth.
D. Contributions in an Imperfect Market
In contrast to the hypothetical market discussed above, the actual
market for these types of transactions is highly imperfect. As discussed
below, at least four important characteristics of this market are respon-
sible for this imperfection: (i) the auction-like market for economic de-
velopments, which deviates from perfect competition in certain respects
and thus presents systematic opportunities for governments to overpay
for the development; (ii) the asymmetrical nature of information since
it is available to one side of the exchange (the corporation) and not the
other (the government), providing the informed party with a definite
strategic advantage; (iii) the susceptibility of state and local govern-
79. As previously mentioned, in a state of perfect competition numerous buyers and sellers
are in the market. See note 70 and accompanying text.
80. Samuelson, Economics at 580-81 (cited in note 4); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction
to Law and Economics at 88-89 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1989).
81. Samuelson, Economics at 468-470.
82. The proposition that the externalities generated by firms have a marginal cost to the
firms of zero is, of course, tautological. Externalities are defined, in the first place, as phenomena
that have no cost to the firm generating them. See note 4.
83. The firm that receives $1 million to locate in Location II, the less desirable location, is, in
effect, receiving zero for its externalities because the $1 million merely offsets the inherently nega-
tive characteristics of settling in the area.
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ments to political pressure, causing them to overbid in the market for
new factory locations; and (iv) the oligopolistic market structure pre-
sent in this market with many buyers (governments) but few sellers
(firms), which allows firms to receive higher prices for the economic de-
velopment that they auction off to various bidders.
In my view, these market imperfections result in a situation in
which firms do experience significant accretions to wealth from receiv-
ing these contributions. Such a conclusion is supported by a significant
amount of evidence accumulated through our historical experience with
these types of arrangements.
The analysis as to whether a corporation has economic income
from receiving contributions for economic development is, as a matter
of logic, independent of the analysis as to whether state and local gov-
ernments overbid for economic development. The analysis as to
whether a corporation receiving a contribution has economic income is
based on whether the amount of the contribution exceeds the relative
disadvantages to the corporation of settling in that particular area.8
Thus, if a corporation receives one hundred dollars as a contribution to
locate in an area, and the relative disadvantages of that area in compar-
ison to other locations is seventy-five dollars, the corporation recognizes
twenty-five dollars of economic income. In contrast, the analysis appli-
cable to a local community potentially overbidding for economic devel-
opment focuses on whether the marginal cost of making the
contribution (including, when appropriate, lost taxes), exceeds the mar-
ginal benefits to the community from more jobs and more spending in
the area. These two analyses are logically independent. Thus, some of
the discussion below (e.g., the discussion of auctions), which suggests
that governments may overpay for economic development, does not
prove that corporations receive economic income when they sell the
same commodity.
This analysis, however, lends some support to my arguments for
taxing corporations. First, the mechanisms that lead to overbidding by
governments for economic development consist of market defects that
generally exert upward pressure on amounts paid by governments in
this market. The existence of these institutional structures, which pre-
sent a systematic bias towards overpayment, would generally increase
the chances, holding other factors constant, that corporations receiving
these payments have income. Moreover, other factors discussed in the
text below (e.g., the presence of asymmetric information and an oligo-
polistic market structure that allows the selling firms to extract benefits
for themselves as opposed to competing them away), are not confined to
84. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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overbidding by governments, but also support the possibility of corpo-
rations extracting income from the economic development market.
85
Thus, although overbidding by governments and income recognition by
corporations are analytically distinct, the following analysis neverthe-
less supports my general thesis that corporations should be taxed on
contributions received in this market.
1. Auctions and Imperfect Competition
The market for economic development largely consists of an auc-
tion-type arrangement in which a particular firm sells its economic de-
velopment to various state and local governments bidding for that
commodity. The existence of this auction mechanism does not necessa-
rily mean that market failure has occured. This type of auction, how-
ever, has two characteristics that differ significantly from a situation of
perfect competition. First, in perfect competition, so many buyers and
sellers are present in the market that one party, acting alone, is unable
to influence the price at which a particular commodity is bought or
sold."' Instead, the party is confronted with what the market has deter-
mined to be the price of an item and has no discretion or power over
the determination of that price. In contrast, the market for economic
development involves the auctioning of development to various bidders
that each have the power to influence the price by placing a winning bid
or by pressuring others to raise their bids.8 7 Second, in perfect competi-
tion, all parties have complete information regarding the characteristics
of the commodity being sold. In the auction for economic develop-
ment, however, the various bidders lack such perfect information re-
garding the economic impact of the particular corporate facility being
sought and may differ in estimating the number of jobs and similar
benefits that the facility will provide to the area.
These two departures from perfect competition provide the condi-
tions for the occurrence of the "winner's curse," documented in the eco-
nomics literature on auctions. 9 The winner's curse may be described as
follows: in an auction involving the sale of an item with uncertain value,
85. The presence of asymmetric information; utilized by corporations to the disadvantage of
local governments, is just as probative of the argument that corporations receive income in this
market as it is of the argument that governments overbid.
86. See note 70.
87. For recognition that this general structure of auctions deviates from perfect competition,
see William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. Fin.
8, 9 (1961).
88. See note 70.
89. See, for example, Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. Econ. Persp. 3-6
(1989); John H. Kagel and Dan Levin, The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common
Value Auctions, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 894 (1986).
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the various parties bidding on the item will have differing views as to
the item's value. Moreover, the person with the most optimistic view of
the item's value will generally be the high bidder in the auction, thus
obtaining the good. Frequently, the high bidder will find that its bid
reflected an erroneously optimistic view of the item's value that ulti-
mately proves to be inflated. Hence, the winner's curse-the fact that a
person submitted the winning bid in an auction may mean that the per-
son has suffered a financial loss by purchasing something for more than
its value.
The winner's curse has been empirically documented to occur in
situations involving, for example, bidding by oil companies for mineral
leases.90 Some evidence suggests that oil companies systematically
overbid. State and local government may also feel the winner's curse.
All the ingredients are present: the value of a factory to a community is
more uncertain than the value of a mineral lease to an oil company and
many unsophisticated bidders are present, who are unlikely to know
how to discount their bids properly. Many experts believe that state
and local governments do, in fact, systematically pay too much for eco-
nomic development.91 The existence of the winner's curse may explain
why.
2. Imperfect Information and Market Failure
As previously noted, in contrast to a perfectly competitive market;
the real market for economic development involves participants with
highly imperfect information. In particular, the communities that are
purchasing this economic development through their local governments
are not aware of the degree to which their natural attractions (proxim-
ity to markets, low costs, etc.) entice a particular firm. As a conse-
quence, these communities do not know how their natural attractions
compare to the natural. attractions of other competing areas from the
perspective of a particular firm considering the location of a factory.
The firms, however, are aware of how they have evaluated areas in
terms of their natural advantages for business location and are similarly
aware of how the competing locations compare to each other in terms of
these advantages. Firms also possess advantages in that they are likely
to know more about the particular product they are selling (i.e., the
economic development provided by their particular facility) than the
state and local governments interested in buying that development.2
90. Kenneth Hendricks, Robert H. Porter and Bryan Boudreau, Information, Returns, and
Bidding Behavior in OCS Auctions: 1954-1969, 35 J. Indust. Econ. 517, 518-19 (1987).
91. See note 106 and accompanying text.
92. Here, the product being sold (economic development) varies from firm to firm, in con-
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1992] NONSHAREHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS 1485
Economists have referred to this type of situation, characterized by
one-sided information, as involving "impacted information" or "infor-
mation impactedness." 93 Impacted information may lead to instances of
market failure;94 here, market failure occurs because the firm oppor-
tunistically95 exploits its informational advantage over the local govern-
ments wishing to purchase its collective goods.9 6
This model, involving impacted information and market failure, is
consistent with the observations of many who have studied this market
in operation. Numerous accounts and studies have portrayed local gov-
trast to a perfectly competitive market involving standardized products. Economic development
provided by one firm may differ, both quantitatively and qualitatively, from the economic develop-
ment provided by another firm. Again, firms are typically in a better position to evaluate the par-
ticular product of economic development that they are selling. Firms know more regarding their
business plans, their commitment to stay in a particular area, the possibilities of any expansion in
their local business activities, and other factors that would affect the desirability of a particular
firm. This creates a situation in which firms are able to overprice the economic development pro-
vided by a certain factory by misrepresenting the quality of the product they are selling. See, for
example, Thomas J. Lueck, Business Incentives: A High-Priced Letdown, N.Y. Times § 4 at 16
(March 8, 1992); Guskind, 21 Nat'l J. at 635 (cited in note 62) (quoting a city council member as
stating that only one-third of jobs promised by corporations moving into an area have material-
ized). State and local governments would be able, however, to respond in a partial manner to this
problem if they were to adopt "clawback arrangements." Clawback arrangements typically provide
that a firm initially receiving a contribution from a government for settling in an area may later
forfeit this contribution if the firm eventually abandons the area or fails to achieve certain levels of
economic development while there. However, most state and local governments do not impose
clawback arrangements, and hence remain vulnerable to overpaying for economic development.
For a discussion of such arrangements, see Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competi-
tion at 54 (cited in note 43).
93. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 14,
31-37 (Free Press, 1975). For other work on market problems created by asymmetrical information,
see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity 47, 54-56, in Joint Economic Com-
mittee, The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: the PPB System, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (U.S.G.P.O. 1969).
94. Rosen, Public Finance at 63 (cited in note 4) (discussing "costly" information as a cause
of market failure). For a discussion of market failure in the insurance industry caused by nonsym-
metrical information and the resulting process of "adverse selection" see Williamson, Markets and
Hierarchies at 23 (cited in note 93); Arrow, Organization of Economic Activity at 35 (cited in note
93). For similar adverse selection problems caused by impacted information in the used car busi-
ness, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970).
95. Opportunism may be defined as the tendency for persons to engage in Machiavellian self-
interest, or "self-interest seeking with guile." Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capital-
ism at 30 (cited in note 10).
96. In a situation involving large numbers of firms attempting to auction off their externali-
ties to governments, competition between the firms might dissipate this informational advantage.
See Williamson, Markets and Heirarchies at 31-32 (cited in note 93) (stating that impacted infor-
mation is especially problematic in "small numbers" exchanges). However, our historical experi-
ence indicates that impacted information, in actuality, provides a significant advantage to the
firms possessing it in the market for economic development. See notes 97-98 and accompanying
text. This suggests, therefore, that there is an absence of competition among firms in this market.
This point is discussed more thoroughly at notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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ernments and community groups as being unaware of the extent to
which the natural features of an area were attractive to firms consider-
ing the location of a new factory.9 7 Thus, the buyers of economic devel-
opment were unaware of important information possessed by the sellers
of that good. Moreover, these same historical accounts have also por-
trayed the firms as keeping this information from the governments, and
in fact, exploiting the ignorance of the governments in an attempt to
create "bidding wars" by playing off competing localities against each
other.9 Firms have extracted contributions from local governments by
threatening to choose other competing sites, even though such threats
may have been largely idle. In summary, the evidence strongly suggests
that firms recognize an accretion to wealth from these contributions
through their exploitation of impacted information among the various
governments and community groups vying for their favor.
3. The Political Process
a. Government Involvement: The Need for Collective Action
State and local governments have become heavily involved in the
market for purchasing economic development. This section explains the
origin of this involvement, which lies in collective-action problems re-
garding the acquisition of economic development. It also develops the
theory that this involvement acts to increase the amounts contributed
by corporations for economic development, thus increasing the likeli-
hood that the corporations recognize economic income from their
receipt.
97. For a typical example, consider the following description of the efforts by Illinois and
other governments to attract a Chrysler/Mitsubishi plant to the state in 1986: "At this period and
throughout the negotiations the automobile industry, not the state, was in the driver's seat ...
[C]orporate officials knew what constituted an acceptable package of incentives to attract the facil-
ity. Government officials were not privy to this information." Lind and Elder, 3 Gov't Fin. Rev. at
20 (cited in note 57). For similar accounts of firms using such informational advantages, see
Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying Into America at 64 (cited in note 36); Jones and Bachelor, Urban
Economic Development at 247 (cited in note 28); Gaynor, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette § 1 at 29 (cited
in note 36); Guskind, 21 Nat'l J. 634 (cited in note 62); Richard Brandt, Wherever GM Puts Sat-
urn, It's Going to Get a Sweet Deal, Business Week 36 (Apr. 1, 1985); Jacobs, Bidding for Busi-
ness: Corporate Auctions and the Disunited States at 54-55 (cited in note 28).
98. See note 97. See also Larry C. Ledebur and William W. Hamilton, The Failure of Tax
Concessions as Economic Development Incentives, in Steven D. Gold, ed., Reforming State Tax
Systems 101, 109-10 (Nat'l Conf. of State Legis., 1986); Paul Glastris, Holdup in the Windy City,
107 U.S. News & World Rep. 40 (July 17, 1989) (asserting that corporations have the "leverage to
place bidders against each other"); Carole Davies and Jon Lowell, Incentives Survive But Live
Quiet Lives; State and Local Aid Given In Quest for Auto Plants, 26 Ward's Auto World 39 (Apr.,
1990); Georgiana Fiordalisi, Did Kentucky Overpay For Toyota: State and Outsiders Have Differ-
ent Views of Incentive Package, Automotive News 18 (July 31, 1989).
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In many respects, the jobs and economic stimulation sought by the
local governments making contributions for economic development are
collective goods, defined as goods that are difficult to exclude others
from enjoying, or, phrased differently, goods that are nonexclusive in
nature.99 These goods are nonexclusive in nature in that merchants and
businesses located in the area will experience the benefit of the eco-
nomic stimulation provided by the factory,100 regardless of whether
those people played any role (or shared any costs) in initially persuad-
ing the firm to locate the factory in that area.
Because of this nonexclusive nature of economic development, the
efforts of local communities to obtain economic development involves
collective action problems,10 1 or "free rider problems." Rational and
self-interested persons living in these communities will frequently have
an incentive, acting in their individual capacity, not to contribute to the
99. For a similar use of the term "collective goods," see Russell Hardin, Collective Action
17-20 (Johns Hopkins, 1982). The critical characteristic of a collective good, as the term is used in
this Article, is that it is difficult or costly to exclude others from enjoying the good. As a result, the
production of the good involves "collective action" problems (or "free rider" problems), discussed
later in the Article. See note 102 and accompanying text. On occasion, the term "public goods" has
been applied to goods having this nonexclusive nature. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective
Action 14-15 & n.21 (Harvard, 1971). However, the types of goods discussed in this Article (jobs
and economic stimulation provided to a community by a factory locating in the area) are not
public goods in the technical sense of the word. A job, for example, is not a public good because
the taking of that job by one person will necessarily eliminate another person from having that
same job as well. Thus, the job lacks "jointness," an essential characteristic of public goods. "Joint-
ness" is defined to mean that the consumption of the good by one person will not diminish the
quantity of the good available for another person. See Hardin, Collective Action at 17; Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (North-Holland, 1954) (stating that "each
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's con-
sumption of that good"), reprinted in Brian Barry and Russell Hardin, eds., Rational Man and
Irrational Society 175 (Sage, 1982). See also Duncan Snidal, Public Goods, Property Rights and
Political Organizations, 23 Int'l Stud. Q. 532, 539-44 (1979), for the proposition that many private,
nonpublic goods present both difficulties in excluding others from their enjoyment, as well as col-
lective action problems. For a critique of Snidal's definitions of public goods as being too narrow,
see Charles Silver, Utilitarian Participation, 23 Soc. Sci. Info. 701, 712-13 (1984).
100. Admittedly, some people might object to the location of a new factory in the area on the
grounds that the factory would result in increased, pollution, traffic, and demand for local services
in the area. See, for example, Crossley, et al., Courier-Journal at Al (cited in note 56) (discussing
the opposition of environmental groups to a new paper plant in Kentucky); Rubin and Zorn, 45
Pub. Admin. Rev. at 334 (cited in note 71) (stating concerns regarding "unmanageable population
density, congested transportation networks, and strained public services"); Harrison and Kanter,
The Political Economy of States' Job-Creation Business Incentives, 44 AIP J. at 429 (cited in
note 28) (discussing increased burdens on housing and social services). In addition to these con-
cerns, some groups representing organized labor have opposed the granting of incentives to attract
new factories on the grounds that the factories were to be staffed by non-union workers. See, for
example, Jay Kraker, Toyota Plant Plows Ahead With No Sign Of Union Pact, Engineering
News-Record 65 (Nov. 27, 1986).
101. Olson, Logic of Collective Action at 11-12 (cited in note 99); Hardin, Collective Action
at 6-9 (cited in note 99).
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recruitment efforts. 102 These persons will have a strong incentive to
"free-ride" off the efforts of others, reasoning that the benefits to them
individually from not making any contributions to the recruiting efforts
will exceed the marginal benefits individually obtained from making
any contributions.0 3
Governments that recruit firms to come to an area have solved this
collective action problem at the municipal, county, and state level by
taxing the inhabitants of the area to pay for the costs of the contribu-
tions made in the recruiting effort. 104 The use of governments, with
their powers of compulsory taxation, to solve this collective action prob-
lem would be expected. 105 What is important, for purposes of this Arti-
cle, is to note that this governmental involvement brings other factors
into play that likely increase the amounts that are paid to firms for
economic development.
b. Politics, Special Interests, and Public Choice Theory
A consensus exists among scholars that corporations, in practice,
generally receive excessive amounts for the economic development they
bring to an area.106 This result occurs in ways consistent with predic-
102. Such incentives are based on the assumption that individuals are motivated largely by
self-interest. See Olson, Logic of Collective Action at 9 (cited in note 99). Some individuals may
have particularly strong moral or ethical beliefs that may cause them to act out of consideration
for others as opposed to pure self-interest. For an examination of the circumstances in which an
individual, adopting utilitarian principles, would have a moral obligation to contribute towards
producing collective goods, see Silver, 23 Soc. Sci. Info. at 701 (cited in note 99).
103. Every rational and self-interested individual in the community will hope that other peo-
ple contribute to the recruiting effort so that the new factory may be brought to the area, although
each individual will have a similar incentive not to personally make any contributions to this
recruiting effort, but rather rely on the efforts of others. See Olson, Logic of Collective Action at
13-14, in which he notes that the nonexclusive nature of public goods creates this problem of
collective action.
104. In addition, to a lesser extent, community groups, such as chambers of commerce and
other local business federations, have been involved in these recruiting efforts. Again, it would be
expected that such groups would be used to overcome the collective action problems in this area.
These organized groups (especially smaller groups) can overcome many of the difficulties of collec-
tive action. Other things being equal, smaller groups are able to overcome collective action
problems more effectively than larger groups. Olson, Logic of Collective Action at 53-57; Hardin,
Collection Action at 38-42 (cited in note 99). These groups overcome collective action problems by
adopting internally coercive measures to insure the cooperation of their members, and by policing
their members to ensure that potential free-riders are discouraged from relying on the efforts of
others to acquire collective goods. Hardin, Collective Action at 174-87.
105. For some time, it has been widely recognized that governments, with their powers of
compulsory taxation, are well-suited to provide collective goods. See Olson, Logic of Collective
Action at 13-14, for discussion of the importance of state taxation in providing public goods.
106. Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competition at 53 (cited in note 43) (stat-
ing that the "preponderance of the evidence . . . regarding state and local competition for eco-
nomic development is that such activity is generally not cost effective from the point of view of the
offering government or the nation as a whole"); Jones and Bachelor, Urban Econ. Development at
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tions of political behavior made by public choice theory 0 7 and other
theories of political action.
Economic development and growth in an area frequently provides
substantial benefits to various members of the community, such as real
estate developers, general business interests, and other influential
groups. 08 Interestingly, such groups include the local press, which ben-
efits from the increased circulation provided by growth. 0 9 This may ex-
plain the relatively favorable treatment provided by the press to the
efforts of communities to attract economic development. In contrast,
the costs of this economic growth, which include the direct expendi-
tures made by the local government to recruit the firm and more subtle
costs resulting from the development itself (i.e., increased congestion,
pollution, and strains on local services), 110 are more likely to be dissi-
pated over a broader number of people, and, correspondingly, to be ex-
perienced by each person only to a moderate extent."'
246-47 (cited in note 28); Ledebur and Hamilton, Reforming State Tax Systems at 110-112 (cited
in iote 98) (defining cost effectiveness as a comparison of the costs incurred by the government to
the benefits obtained by the firm, but arguing that the same results would occur if the benefits to
the local area were to be taken into account as well). Accord David W. Rasmussen, Marc Bendick,
Jr., and Larry C. Ledebur, A Methodology for Selecting Economic Development Incentives, 15
Growth and Change 18 (Jan., 1984); Compare Netzer, Competition Among States and Local Gov-
ernments at 231-236 (cited in note 59) (discussing the methodological difficulties of determining
the effectiveness of such programs and the resulting uncertainty in this area).
107. Public choice theory would be defined as the application of economic theories to explain
political behavior, or, more briefly, as the application of economics to political science. Dennis C.
Mueller, Public Choice (Cambridge, 1979).
108. See Harold A. Hovey, Interstate Tax Competition, in Reforming State Tax Systems at
89-90 (cited in note 38). For a general argument that such special interests are the influential force
behind "boosterism" and other growth oriented programs, see Harvey Molotch, The City as a
Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 Am. J. Soc. 309 (1976); John L. Logan
and Moshe Semyonov, Growth and Succession in Suburban Communities, 21 Soc. Q. 93, 95-96
(1980); John R. Logan, Growth, Politics, and the Stratification of Places, 84 Am. J. Soc. 404, 408-
10 (1978) (noting the importance of various groups in promoting economic growth for a particular
locality).
109. See Hovey, Interstate Tax Competition, in Reforming State Tax Systems at 90 (noting
that the "media" is at the "top of the list" in groups which gain from economic development. The
media benefits substantially from increased circulation which in turn results in higher advertising
revenue without accompanying increases in production costs).
110. For a discussion of strains on services created by new growth, see Stephen Phillips, The
Town That Toyota Took From 0 to 60, Business Week 20B (July 11, 1988). See also note 100.
111. See Hovey, Interstate Tax Competition, in Reforming State Tax Systems at 90 (noting
that the "drawbacks" of growth "tend not to be mentioned much"); Richard C. Maurer and James
A. Christenson, Growth and Nongrowth Orientations of Urban, Suburban, and Rural Mayors:
Reflections on the City as a Growth Machine, 63 Soc. Sci. Q. 350, 352 (1982). I do not mean to
imply that all political pressures originate from forces in support of economic growth in an area.
The existence of special interest groups favoring nongrowth, preservationist tendencies is well
known. However, sufficient numbers of motivated people favoring growth do exist in positions of
power to provide adequate demand for such growth, and to fuel the market for economic develop-
ment which allows firms to receive contributions for settling in a particular area.
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Under 'certain branches of public choice theory, this is the perfect
scenario'12 for politicians to appeal to special interests that have sub-
stantial stakes in continuing economic development, while safely ignor-
ing the relatively minor (and perhaps unexpressed)"' interests of others
who are inconvenienced by this growth. Indeed, various accounts of the
market for economic development have characterized the behavior of
the parties in a manner consistent with this theory."4 Public choice
theory's explanation of political behavior would predict this phenome-
non of politicians engaging in activities that are not cost-effective. Poli-
ticians will readily subsidize a certain area in which special interests
have strong and identifiable stakes, although the benefits of the subsi-
dies to the community at large may be less than their costs." 5
Moreover, the argument that the political process places upward
pressure on amounts firms receive for economic development remains
credible even if one rejects the explanation of political behavior offered
112. These particular versions of public choice theory emphasize the power of special interest
groups to influence the political process to their own advantage, while the relatively minor and
diluted interests of the general populace are typically ignored. See, for example, Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory of Democracy 94-95 (Harper, 1957); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competi-
tion Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. Econ. 371, 385-86 (1983); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18
J. L. & Econ. 875, 877 (1975), For this literature's treatment of the legislative process regarding
federal income tax benefits, a subject analogous to the market for economic development and state
tax abatements, see Richard L. Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987); Richard L. Doernberg and
Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891 (1987). For general discussions of these particular versions of public choice
theory, see Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 12-23 (Chicago, 1991);
Mueller, Public Choice at 148-70 (cited in note 107).
113. Indeed, collective-action problems may prevent people with relatively minor preferences
on an issue from developing effective political coalitions to express their preferences. See note 104.
114. See Harrison and Kanter, 44 AIP J. at 433 (cited in note 28); Molotch, 82 Am. J. Soc. at
310, 314 (cited in note 108) (describing individuals who influence local pro-growth efforts as indi-
viduals having the most at stake with respect to land-use decisions); John C. Logan, Industrializa-
tion and the Stratification of Cities in Suburban Regions, 82 Am. J. Soc. 333, 339 (1976) (noting
that groups representing the interests of real estate developers and general business interests are
heavily involved in promoting growth activity that may be adverse to other residents of the com-
munity); Jacobs, Bidding For Business at 52-54 (cited in note 28).
115. In many respects, this pattern of activity is simply an example of the exploitation of the
political process in order to finance special interest projects. Such activity takes place by utilizing
traditional logrolling practices in which a gioup of legislators engage in reciprocal voting patterns
in which each legislator supports the other's proposals, in return for a promise of similar support.
Through this vote trading process, the group may adopt projects that it would have rejected under
a system of simple majority rule. These logrolling practices may result in government overspending
on projects that benefit a few interest groups in the community, while the cost of such projects are
financed by the general populace. See Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. Pol.
Econ. 571, 575, 578 (1959); William H. Riker and Steven F. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading,
67 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1235, 1247 (1973). Contrast Mueller, Public Choice at 50-51 (cited in note
107) (noting that, in some situations, logrolling may produce positive results in which the aggregate
utility of the entire group is increased).
1490
1992] NONSHAREHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS 1491
by these branches of public choice theory. Recent attacks on this ver-
sion of public choice theory have criticized the theory as being unduly
narrow in portraying politicians as venal captives of special interests
whose main interest is selling political favors to the highest bidder.1 '
Studies of political behavior have indicated that, in addition to appeas-
ing special interests, other factors may significantly affect the behavior
of politicians. For example, the desire for reelection, power, and pres-
tige, as well as the desire to further one's personal ideology by promot-
ing "good policy," may play significant roles in motivating politicians to
act in various ways.
1117
Even if these more complex models are correct, however, they still
are consistent with the argument that politicians are motivated to re-
cruit firms to settle in an area, even at the cost of paying excessive
amounts to those firms. Our experience indicates that politicians who
succeed in recruiting firms to an area generally receive substantial pub-
licity and prestige as a result of their recruiting efforts; conversely, poli-
ticians who fail in recruiting efforts may suffer significant political
damage from being perceived as paying inadequate attention to eco-
nomic development."18 Thus, politicians can claim credit for the visible
116. See, for example, Kay Kehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests
and American Democracy 401-03 (Harper & Row, 1986) who conducted a study of political behav-
ior and concluded that models that view politics as an exclusively marketplace activity, with politi-
cal favors for sale to the highest bidder, are deficient. Instead, more complex models that
acknowledge the importance of nonmarketplace values, such as the personal views of elected offi-
cials, are more consistent with the realities of the American political experience. See also Farber
and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 27-33 (cited in note 112), who criticize public choice theory
as underestimating the influence of ideology on political behavior.
117. For an insightful argument that such factors played a critical role in recent federal tax
legislation, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 64-100
(1990). Professor Shaviro rejects the branches of public choice theory that portray politicians as
exclusively motivated by the desire to appease special interests, noting that other empirical studies
indicate that a far richer and more complex set of factors is actually at work. See, for example,
Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees 1-3 (Little Brown, 1973) (noting that members
of the U.S. House of Representatives act to achieve the goals of reelection, influence, and good
public policy, and noting that members of the House Ways & Means Committee, in particular,
place importance on prestige and power); John F. Manley, The Politics of Finance, The House
Committee on Ways and Means 60, 68-72 (Little Brown, 1970) (noting that members of the House
Ways & Means Committee are strongly motivated by the desire for dignity, power, and prestige).
This literature is important because its conclusions regarding political behavior of congressional
tax writers may be closely analogous to the behavior of state and local politicians who provide tax
incentives to firms in the economic development market. Contrast Shaviro, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
86-87, who argues that his conclusions regarding congressional behavior also apply to other non-
elected individuals in the Washington, D.C. political community.
118. See Paul G. Glastris, 107 U.S. News & World Rep. at 40 (cited in note 98) (noting that
"[o]fficials who balk at sweetening the [incentive] pot put their necks on the line, while politicians
who go along get the glory"); Nonna A. Noto, Trying To Understand The Economic Development
Official's Dilemma, in Daphne Kenyon and John Kincaid, eds., Competition Among States and
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benefits of growth and new development, while conveniently ignoring
many subtle and obscure costs incurred in obtaining that develop-
ment.119 Moreover, many politicians undoubtedly believe that promot-
ing growth in an area is "good policy;" one can make a strong argument
that people who seek and achieve positions of political power are fre-
quently ideologically disposed toward pro-growth beliefs. 120 Thus, sup-
porting government incentive programs for economic development
would be consistent with the ideological background of many people
elected to positions of power. Consequently, a number of factors other
than the desire to appease special interest groups may explain the vig-
orous promotion of economic growth, even at the cost of paying what
may be excessive amounts for economic development.
c. Lack of Accountability
An additional factor aggravating the tendencies of the political pro-
cess to overspend in purchasing economic development is that the costs
of acquiring economic development are frequently hidden and not ac-
counted for in a clear manner. A large part of the problem is simply
that these costs may be quite subtle and, as a result, frequently may be
ignored. I have already mentioned some of these costs such as increased
congestion, pollution, and strains on local services, which are difficult to
trace to a particular source and are often times overlooked. 12' Moreover,
other types of costs incurred to acquire economic development lend
themselves to this lack of accountability. For example, politicians are
Local Governments at 251, 254 (Urban Inst., 1991) (noting the importance of the downside risk of
being blamed for failing to recruit firms); Gaynor, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette § 1 at 29 (cited in note
36) (quoting a state official as mentioning the political importance of successfully recruiting firms
to an area); North Carolina Vies For Semiconducter Project, UPI-Regional News (June 17, 1987)
(discussing political battles between Republicans and Democrats concerning charges of inadequate
attention to economic development). But see Guskind, 56 Planning at 5 (cited in note 56) (noting
voter anger at the mayor of a Michigan town for giving excessive benefits to a firm locating in the
area, resulting in the mayor eventually being voted out of office).
119. See note 110. See also the comments of Professor Kenyon regarding the market for
economic development that "[t]he way it is now, all that gets counted in the political calculus is
the benefits, not the costs," quoted in Glastris, 107 U.S. News & World Rep. at 41 (July 17, 1989).
120. See Molotch, 82 Am. J. Soc. at 317-18 (cited in note 108), who argues that people
elected to positions of office are, typically speaking, more likely to be in favor of growth than
members of the population in general. See also Hovey, Interstate Tax Competition, in Reforming
State Tax Systems at 90 (cited in note 38) who notes that "[s]tate officials, almost without excep-
tion, have a strong commitment to economic development," while also stating that "there isn't a
race for governor in which the candidates did not try to outpromise each other on economic devel-
opment issues." Compare Harold Dwight Laswell, Power and Personality 39-58 (W. W. Norton,
1948) (discussing the traits associated with the "political personality").
121. See notes 100 and 110. See Rubin and Zorn, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 334 (cited in note
71), who support the notion that policymakers do not sufficiently appreciate the costs resulting
from economic development, including lost taxes and increased congestion and pollution.
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frequently able to portray tax abatements offered to a firm as costs that
are not "real" and that should not be "counted," on the grounds that if
the firm had not located in the area, the community would have col-
lected no taxes whatsoever from the firm. Thus, based on such argu-
ments, tax abatements provided to the firm should not be viewed with
the same seriousness as "out of pocket" costs.
122
An additional factor aggravating this problem is that the budgetary
processes of state and local governments are notoriously ineffective in
accurately portraying the costs of tax abatements and other incentive
programs, 2 although proposals for reform have repeatedly been
made.124 Part of this problem may result from the fact that states, de-
velopment agencies, and other involved parties have an incentive to un-
derstate the costs of such programs, and overstate their benefits. 25 In
addition to this problem of bias, many state and local governments lack
the financial sophistication to account for these programs in an accurate
manner, although there are signs that the level of sophistication may be
122. For a recognition of this problem, see Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Com-
petition at 54 (cited in note 43). There are two problems with this argument. First, tax abatements
in many situations may function as a proxy for the costs of services (police, fire and other commu-
nity services) used by a firm locating in an area. Thus, ignoring tax abatements results in the
community overlooking the real costs of attracting a firm to locate in an area. Moreover, as dis-
cussed later, in some situations a firm would have settled in the particular area anyway, irrespec-
tive of whether tax abatements and other contributions would have been offered. To the extent
this is true, then providing tax abatements to that firm represents real out-of-pocket costs. Harri-
son and Kanter, 44 AIP J. at 429-30 (cited in note 28) (pointing out the real costs of incentive
programs that do not result in increases in new jobs, and criticizing cost-benefit studies of incen-
tive programs as only comparing economic conditions before and after the incentive programs,
while not attempting to make the more relevant comparison of economic conditions with and with-
out the program.)
123. See, for example, Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying Into America at 66 (cited in note 36)
(stating that "[n]o one really knows how much is spent in the aggregate on these incentive pack-
ages and how much they cost the taxpayer. What is clear is that the cost is substantial and that
some inequities are inevitable"); Paul Glastris, 107 U.S. News & World Report at 40 (cited in note
98); Rubin and Zorn, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 333 (cited in note 71) (discussing the "sizable hidden
costs associated" with economic development activities). But see Netzer, in Competition Among
States and Local Governments at 234 (cited in note 59) (stating that "many" states regularly
publish reports of the costs of economic incentive programs).
124. For an example of such proposals, see Rasmussen, Bendick and Ledebur, 15 Growth
and Change 18 (cited in note 106); Researcher: States Should Car-pool When Seeking Japanese
Car Plant, UPI (Oct. 29, 1990) (quoting a University of Illinois professor as recommending that
states and local authorities adopt a number of analytical and accounting procedures to help avoid
overpaying for economic development); Davies and Lowell, 26 Ward's Auto World at 39 (cited in
note 98) (quoting Larry Ledebur, a prominent researcher in the field, as emphasizing the need for
more sophistication among state and local officials in dealing in this area).
125. These groups have an incentive to portray these activities in a favorable manner in
order to justify their actions and assure that these programs will be continued in the future. See,
for example, Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competition at 52 (cited in note 43)
(noting the incentives to create biased data). See also Netzer, Competition Among States and
Local Governments at 231.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
improving.'26 Still, the lack of coherent treatment of the costs of eco-
nomic development reduces the accountability of the political process,
and likely increases the size of contributions made to corporations lo-
cating in an area.
4. Oligopolistic Market Structures
Another reason why firms likely earn economic income from receiv-
ing these contributions is that the structural pattern of sellers (firms)
and buyers (governments) participating in the economic development
market differs sharply from the theoretical model of perfect competi-
tion characterized by virtually unlimited numbers of buyers and sell-
ers. 2 7 In a situation of perfect competition, large numbers of buyers
and sellers prevent sellers from lowering the quantity of items produced
and extracting economic profits from the increase in prices that would
occur from such a reduced supply. 28 Instead, in a competitive market,
any attempt by one party to raise the price of an item by reducing its
supply will be offset immediately by other sellers providing more of the
item, thus frustrating the initial party's attempt to extract an economic
profit through the activity.
In contrast, the market for economic development exhibits the
traits of an oligopolistic market in which there are few sellers (firms) of
an item, and literally thousands of buyers (local and state governments)
competing against each other in their attempts to attract firms.'29 Such
a theory is supported, in part, by the extremely heated competition
among governments that immediately takes place when firms announce
plans to open a new facility.130 Moreover, the conclusion that this mar-
126. See, for example, Netzer, Competition Among States and Local Governments at 234.
127. For recognition of the possibility that reduced competition could result in firms receiv-
ing income from these contributions, see Note, 66 Yale L. J. at 631 (cited in note 2).
128. Technically, in a state of perfect competition, a firm has no control over the price it is
able to obtain by selling a product. Instead, the firm may sell as much as it wishes of a particular
good at the market price, without the firm's activity affecting such price for the good in any man-
ner. Samuelson, Economics at 457-58 (cited in note 4). Thus, in such a situation, the firm will
continue to produce the good until its marginal cost of production equals the good's market price.
It would be completely ineffectual for the firm to attempt to manipulate the market price for the
good by reducing the quantity of goods it produces.
129. For a discussion of oligopoly, see Samuelson, Economics at 462. For recognition that the
market for economic development does, in fact, consist of this competitive imbalance of few sellers
and many buyers, see Jones and Bachelor, Urban Economic Development at 246-47, 264-66 (cited
in note 28); Compare Rubin and Zorn, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 334 (cited in note 71) (noting the
intensity of competition among increasingly large numbers of governmental units for economic
development).
130. See, for example, Stevenson, N.Y. Times at Al (cited in note 62) (discussing the heated
competition for a McDonnell Douglas Plant); Deters, Arizona Republic at F4 (cited in note 62);
Janice Castro, Come on Down! Fast!, Time 38 (May 27, 1991); Bob Lowry, Austin Finalist For
U.S. Memories, UPI Release (Oct. 24, 1989). Periodically, one reads accounts claiming that the
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ket is oligopolistic in nature is also supported, inferentially, by the
strong consensus (previously discussed)"3 ' that asymmetrical or "im-
pacted" information creates bargaining advantages for corporations in
dealing with state and local governments. In a highly competitive mar-
ketplace, such informational advantages would not be significant. Com-
petitive pressures would force corporations to either disclose the
information to the other side, or completely bargain away the benefits
of such information. s2 Thus, the continuing existence of such asymmet-
rical information as a powerful force in this market strongly supports
the conclusion that the market is oligopolistic in nature.
Admittedly, this market structure of many buyers and few sellers
may result from technological reasons as opposed to undue industrial
concentration.'33 Firms engage in constructing new plants and factories
on only an occasional basis. Moreover, any one firm is likely, for econo-
mies of scale and reasons of manufacturing technology, to construct one
new factory to build an item as opposed to constructing several new
factories. 134 Thus, technological reasons may account for the relative
scarcity of new plants being constructed at any one time, while large
numbers of state and local governments eagerly await the possibilities
of recruiting such plants. 3 5 Such a market, however, results in prices
level of competition among state and local governments for economic development is declining.
See, for example, Gaynor, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette § 1 at 29 (cited in note 36). However, such
claims may simply reflect wishful thinking on the part of state and local governments, and should
be viewed with skepticism. In contrast, other recent articles portray the competition for economic
development as intensifying, due, in part, to economic problems currently facing many areas of the
country. See, for example, Castro, Time at 38. See also Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Pol-
icy Competition at 50 (cited in note 43) (concluding that the number of incentives offered contin-
ues to grow, based on personnel budgets for state development agencies).
131. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
132. See note 96.
133. The reader should note that I am only arguing that the market for economic develop-
ment among firms is oligopolistic in nature. In contrast, the markets for the output of these firms
which they produce and sell to customers may be highly competitive. For the recognition that a
firm may operate in two markets, with the two markets differing in the degree of competition
present in each, see Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 80 Yale L. J. 195,
228-29 (1970) (discussing differences in the markets for two products sold by the firm, and the
potential for tie-ins created by these differences).
134. Samuelson, Economics at 539 (cited in note 4) (observing that economies of scale for
modern technologies "increasingly require larger and larger plants") Other factors in addition to
economies of scale influence plant size and location, including transportation costs to distant mar-
kets, freight costs of raw materials, labor rates, and taxes. Schmenner, Making Business Location
Decisions at 126-28 (cited in note 42).
135. Periodically, state and local governments attempt to enter into various types of agree-
ments and "understandings" among themselves in order to reduce the level of competition for
economic development. For a proposal to reduce competition by such arrangements, see, for exam-
ple, Kenyon, Interjurisdictional Tax and Policy Competition (cited in note 43). Apparently, such
proposals have not worked; see notes 130-31 and accompanying text for discussions of the continu-
ing intensity of competition among state and local governments.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
being bid up to reflect the relative scarcity of supply. In turn, increased
prices for economic development mean that firms are more likely to ex-
perience an increase in economic wealth from receiving the
contributions.
E. Problems with the Foregoing Proposals Regarding Payments for
Economic Development
Based on the foregoing analysis, corporations receiving contribu-
tions made for the purposes of generating economic development
should recognize taxable income from the contributions equal to the
fair market value of the property or benefits received.136 Although such
a proposal would represent an improvement over present law, in some
situations it would, admittedly, overtax firms. First, as previously
noted, firms receiving these contributions may compete them away in
the marketplace by reducing the prices charged for goods and services
they provide to customers. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that this
phenomenon may not occur, i.e., that firms treat these contributions as
essentially windfalls that do not enter into any calculus regarding the
firm's future prices charged to customers.37 Notwithstanding this evi-
dence, the possibility remains that firms compete these contributions
away by lowering future prices charged to customers. As previously set
forth, however, these contributions can be defended on the grounds
that taxation will reduce the amount of price discounts offered to the
firms' customers. Reducing the extent of the price discounts is desirable
in that it reduces the misallocation of resources resulting from the exis-
tence of these nonneutral locational incentives that only certain types
of firms are able to obtain. Therefore, the possibility of overtaxation
caused by these competitive pressures is not a concern. The discussion
below addresses a more serious issue regarding the foregoing proposals
to tax these firms.
136. All legal precedent that has allowed firms to exclude these contributions from income
should be expressly overturned. This would include the Brown Shoe decision (cited in note 5),
Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956) (cited in note 5), IRS Notice 87-82 (cited in note 5), and all other
precedent allowing firms to receive contributions for economic development without recognizing
taxable income. If these proposals were adopted, and firms were required to recognize taxable
income upon receipt of these contributions, the firms would be allowed to receive a tax basis repre-
senting their costs in the property. For a discussion of this point, see note 8.
137. See, for example, the discussion of how companies view incentives in Tolchin and
Tolchin, Buying into America at 62-67 (cited in note 36). See also Jones and Bachelor, Local
Policy Discretion, in Urban Economic Development at 262-65 (cited in note 28); Michael J.
Wolkoff, Is Economic Development Decision Making Rational?, 27 Urban Affairs Quarterly 340




1. Overtaxation from Locating in Suboptimal Areas
Consider the previous example involving a firm wishing to locate a
factory that is approached by communities from two locations. Location
I is the most naturally advantageous to the firm, in terms of providing
good transportation, inexpensive labor costs, and other natural advan-
tages. Location II, in contrast, is the less attractive site. As in the previ-
ous example, assume that Location I's advantages over Location II's are
equivalent, in monetary terms, to a lump-sum payment of $1 million.
That is, the firm would require a payment of $1 million to locate in
Location II as opposed to choosing the naturally attractive site of Loca-
tion I. Now, assume that the firm eventually settles in Location II, and
receives benefits with a fair market value of $1.5 million as an induce-
ment to locate in that area.13 8 Under the foregoing proposal, the firm
would include the $1.5 million in taxable income. However, such a re-
sult would be incorrect and would overtax the firm-the firm's accre-
tion in wealth was actually only $.5 million, which is the amount that
should be included in income. The additional $1 million received by the
firm over this amount merely serves to offset the disadvantages inher-
ent in Location II, and should not be included in the firm's income be-
cause it is not an accretion to wealth.
Admittedly, some actual situations falling into this pattern would
be overtaxed under the foregoing proposal. Although the perfect rem-
edy would be to bifurcate somehow the payment received by the firm,
and only include the $.5 million in income, such an approach would be
inadministrable and unacceptably complex. 3 9 The only administrable
way for the tax laws to deal with this phenomenon is an "all or noth-
ing" approach. 140 Present law allows firms to completely exclude these
contributions from income, while the law should instead require the en-
tire amount to be included in income.
The first response to this problem of overtaxing the firm settling in
Location II is to argue that overtaxation might actually be a desirable
outcome. Overtaxation would promote economic efficiency by discour-
aging the firm from choosing Location II instead of Location I. The sec-
ond response is that it is unlikely that many firms will choose Location
II because of their ability to extract favorable concessions from Loca-
tion I. Thus, the problem of overtaxation is a hypothetical one, and not
especially likely to occur on a frequent basis in the real world.
138. As previously discussed, in a perfectly competitive marketplace, Location II would only
offer $1 million to the firm as an inducement for the firm to locate its factory. I have altered the
example in the text immediately above, to illustrate the premiums that are likely to be received by
the firm due to the presence of market failure in this area.
139. See note 24 regarding the need for less complexity in the tax law.
140. For previous discussion of this point, see notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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2. A Defense of Taxing Firms Locating in Suboptimal Areas
It is arguably desirable to overtax the firm by including the entire
$1.5 million payment in the firm's income, even though $1 million of
the payment represents compensation to the firm for the deficiencies of
Location II and not economic income. Some scholars have noted that it
might be inefficient for the firm to settle in Location 11,141 because that
region possesses disadvantages (such as high manufacturing costs) that
reduce the productivity of capital employed in the area. In other words,
the economically desirable outcome is for the firm to build its factory in
Location I, because that location offers an environment with lower costs
and other increased efficiencies. Arguably, the nation's wealth decreases
when Location II entices the firm to build its factory in that area, as
opposed to the naturally preferable area of Location I.
Based on this argument, overtaxing the firm by including the entire
$1.5 million in income is not necessarily a bad result. Such treatment
will discourage the firm from settling in Location II, and will generally
make it more difficult for high-cost jurisdictions to attract firms by of-
fering them nonneutral incentives. Overtaxation of the firm will thereby
reduce the pernicious effects of interstate rivalry, which manifest in
nonneutral and inefficient locational incentives.
The problem with applying this argument in this particular situa-
tion is that the individuals living in Location II may value the positive
externalities of economic development more than the individuals living
in Location I. This discrepancy in the value placed on economic devel-
opment may very well explain the difference in the bids offered by the
two jurisdictions. Thus, it is not necessarily inefficient for a firm to set-
tle in Location II, even though that location presents a higher-cost envi-
ronment to the firm, if those higher economic costs are offset by
additional utility obtained by the residents of that location. Conse-
quently, the argument that nonneutral incentives offered by states are
undesirable may fail to take into account the varying subjective prefer-
ences of the residents of those areas. Admittedly, the additional incen-
tives offered by Location II to the corporation settling in its area are
not necessarily reflective of the general population's preference for eco-
nomic growth. Instead, the extent of preferences offered by Location II
may reflect the degree to which special, pro-development interests con-
trol government activities and influence government appropriations. To
the extent that the difference in bids reflects different degrees of special
interest control over a locality's political apparatus, then the initial
point remains and taxing the firm is acceptable. I am not aware of any
141. Shaviro, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 900-03 (cited in note 38).
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empirical evidence that would help determine which of these situations
is more common in the real world, although observers of the market for
economic development have repeatedly noted the importance of special
interests in supporting local government efforts to obtain that develop-
ment.14 2 Thus, while this argument supporting overtaxtion is credible, I
prefer the second argument, stated below, which relies on the thesis
that these incidents of overtaxation will occur on a relatively infrequent
basis.
3. The Relative Infrequency of Overtaxation
Consider again the previous example involving Locations I and II,
and alter the example to reflect the more realistic assumption that
many different locations are competing for firms in this market. For
reasons discussed below, firms apparently are able to settle in areas
having the natural advantages of Location I, while at the same time
managing to extract incentive packages from those areas that they ulti-
mately choose. Thus, in practice, firms obtain the best of both
worlds-a business location with natural advantages and contributions
from state and local governments to settle in the location that the firms
likely would have adopted anyway. As a result, the hypothetical prob-
lem discussed above in which a firm would choose a less desirable site
(Location II) in return for contributions from that area's governments,
may occur on a relatively infrequent basis.
The conclusion that firms settle in areas that already possess natu-
ral business advantages is supported by evidence suggesting that firms
determine the particular region in which to locate based on natural fac-
tors (access to customers and suppliers, costs of labor, availability of
transportation, etc.) present in that region, without incentives offered
by communities playing any significant role in this initial determina-
tion.14 3 After having made this regional decision based on natural busi-
ness advantages, a firm then decides on the particular site within the
region. This latter decision may be influenced by competing offers the
firm receives from various communities within the region.14 4 In effect,
142. See notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
143. Rubin and Zorn, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 335 (cited in note 71); Harrison and Kanter, 44
AlP J. at 430 (cited in note 28). See also note 144. The implication of such an argument is that the
differences between regions of the country in transportation, raw materials, and other important
variables are simply too large to be offset effectively by incentives offered to firms.
144. Jacobs, Bidding for Business: Corporate Auctions and the 50 Disunited States at 31
(cited in note 28) (stating that "[i]n general, the evidence indicates that investment subsidies are
somewhat effective in moving industry to different areas within a state, rarely adequate to induce a
firm to locate in a neighboring state, and almost never sufficient to lure a firm to another region of
the country"). See Harrison and Kanter, 44 AlP J. at 428 (cited in note 28) (stating that "[o]nce a
region (e.g., a state) has been selected, the choice of a particular location within that region may
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after having narrowed the search to communities all roughly sharing
the advantages of Location I, a firm then settles on a particular commu-
nity based, in part, on the amount of contributions that the community
offers to the firm.
Moreover, even if only one particular location (as opposed to sev-
eral) is optimal for a firm, the firm can easily create a bidding war be-
tween that location and other less desirable locations, and thereby
extract a concession from the jurisdiction that it would have chosen
anyway.145 The firm likely will succeed in such an endeavor for reasons
already discussed. Because of asymmetrical or impacted information
4 6
the firm will be able to keep representatives of the optimal location
from knowing how desirable their area is to the firm. Combining this
informational advantage with the political pressure on officials to avoid
losing business to other areas'47 creates a situation in which the firm
readily extracts a concession from an area that is already optimal to the
firm.
turn on interjurisdictional variations in costs and site amenities. However, tax differentials appear,
from recent research, not to be particularly important at this level either"). See, for example,
Rubin and Zorn, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. at 333, 335 (cited in note 71) (concluding that incentive
packages play little or no role in a firm's choices among regions); Tolchin and Tolchin, Buying Into
America at 62-64 (cited in note 36) (concluding that for a Japanese firm locating in Georgia, "in-
centives played an important part but a very minor one, and only at the very last stage of the
process;" later, the author describes the incentives as "icing on the cake" and "easily duplicated
almost anywhere else").
145. As an example, see the following:
Shervin Freed, vice president of. . .the Chicago-based consulting firm [which assists
corporations in choosing plant sites] said that he recently examined one deal where rival
states had engaged in a bidding war for a small manufacturing plant. The highest bidder was
ultimately the winner. But it would have been anyway, because of looser environmental regu-
lations and transportation cost advantages that amounted to several hundred thousand dol-
lars a year. "Of course they didn't know that," he said. He said that his firm typically advised
clients who have pretty much decided on a location in one state to choose a backup in an-
other, just because it may pry loose some extra incentives for the first choice to feel some
competition.
Gaynor, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette § 1 at 29 (cited in note 36). See also Brandt, Business Week at 36
(cited in note 97) (suggesting that General Motors adopted this strategy with respect to its Saturn
automobile plant); Glastris, 107 U.S. News & World Rep. at 40 (cited in note 98) (suggesting that
Sears & Roebuck employed such a strategy when it chose the community of Hoffman Estates to
relocate its corpoicte headquarters, by putting pressure on Hoffman Estates officials to sweeten
their incentive package through indicating, falsely, that Sears was seriously considering the city of
Chicago as an alternative cite); Hatfield, Setzer and Carr, Engineering News-Record at 20 (cited in
note 62) (quoting Larry Ledebur, an expert on the economic development market, as saying that
"[g]overnors throw money at firms that would locate there anyway without the tax abatements");
Fiordalisi, Automotive News at 18 (cited in note 98) (suggesting that a similar phenomenon oc-
curred in forcing Kentucky to pay more than necessary to attract an automobile plant to the
state).
146. See notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
147. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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Concededly, firms may occasionally locate in suboptimal areas.
Nevertheless, such settlement activities occur on a relatively infrequent
basis compared to the number of firms settling in optimal areas. Thus,
the foregoing proposals would not create a significant risk of overtaxa-
tion, although admittedly some firms would be overtaxed.
Based on this analysis, I believe that the amounts received by firms
for economic development are more likely to represent accretions to the
firm's wealth, as opposed to offsets that serve to make up for natural
deficiencies occurring in the particular community. Although such an
approach has its inaccuracies, in the aggregate it appears to measure
more properly a firm's income than the present law approach, which
allows a complete exclusion of these amounts.
IV. TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC ASSETS
A. Background and Description
In this section of the Article, I discuss the second category of non-
shareholder contributions to capital, which involve contributions by
customers to corporations of specialized assets, or "transaction-specific
assets," that are used in future transactions occurring between the two
parties."1 8 Transaction-specific assets are defined by their one central
trait: once these assets are committed to a particular project, their eco-
nomic values become greater when used for specific types of functions,
than when used for other general purposes." 9 The federal income tax
laws generally require that a corporation receiving contributions of
these transaction-specific assets include the fair market value of the as-
sets in its taxable income.15 0 Similarly, current law would tax a corpora-
tion receiving a contribution of cash that was earmarked to be used in
the construction of such an asset. 15 The stated rationale is that such
contributions represent compensation being paid to the corporation for
services the corporation will provide in the future.152 Under this ration-
148. See note 10 and accompanying text.
149. Williamson, Antitrust Economics at 64 n.39 (cited in note 10).
150. See note 8.
151. Generally, corporations receiving these contributions are in the same economic position,
regardless of whether the contributions are received "in-kind" in the form of the transaction-spe-
cific assets themselves, or, alternatively, in earmarked cash. Under my proposals, both types of
contributions would generally be excluded from the recipients' income. Similarly, the corporate
receipient would not have any tax basis in assets so excluded from its income. However, in-kind
contributions should be treated differently from cash contributions in one situation. When a corpo-
ration receives cash contributions in excess of those amounts necessary to construct transaction-
specific assets dedicated to the customer, the corporation should be taxed on those excess amounts
received. In such a situation, the corporation is earning revenue from serving as a constructor of
the transaction-specific asset, and therefore should be currently taxed on such construction in-
come. Monies that were spent on constructing the transaction-specific asset, however, still would
be excluded from the corporation's income under my proposals.
152. Blue-Book-1986 Act at 544-45 (cited in note 8).
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ale, the person making the contributions is prepaying for future services
to be received from the corporation; such prepaid income is generally
taxable to the corporation upon receipt. 5 s I believe this rationale is in-
correct and that the corporation has not received income in any form
(whether prepaid or not) from receiving the contribution. In my view,
the corporation does not experience an accretion to wealth that would
justify the taxation of the contribution.1
5 4
These contributions in aid of construction are generally made for
the purpose of engaging in specific, future transactions with the recipi-
ent corporation. I already have referred to the example involving a
home-owner contributing a water line to a utility as a condition of re-
ceiving water services from the utility.155 Other transactions also share
this common feature of specialized assets being contributed to another
party who will use those assets in providing future services to the con-
tributors. For example, an automobile manufacturer may contribute
specialized dies to a subcontractor, in order that the subcontractor
might produce automobile bodies for the manufacturer under the man-
ufacturer's specifications. 156 As another example, a group of individuals
living in a remote area might collectively contribute a large antenna (or
cash necessary to construct the antenna) to a corporation that would
use the antenna in broadcasting television programs to their homes.1
57
153. For a general discussion of the law taxing prepaid income upon its receipt, see note 9.
For an insightful analysis of these various rules and their economic impact, see Robert H. Scarbor-
ough, Payments in Advance of Performance, 69 Taxes 798 (1991).
154. Of course, since contributions of transaction-specific assets would be excluded from the
recipient corporations' income, they would receive no tax basis in such assets. For a discussion of
the significance of this point, see note 6.
155. See note 8. Under the tax laws, a technical distinction exists between contributions in
aid of construction and "customer connection fees." Briefly, the former term includes contribu-
tions made to a utility on behalf of two or more customers desiring utility services, while customer
connection fees involve only contributions made on behalf of one customer. IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8723023 (Mar. 6, 1987). (But see Nov. 5, 1987 Letter from Edison Electric Institute to Mr. Geoffrey
Taylor, Associate Director-Corporation Tax 2 of the Internal Revenue Service expressing the argu-
ment that transmission lines servicing only one customer are nevertheless contributions in aid of
construction, and not customer connection fees.) Although the historical tax treatment of these
two different contributions differs, for the purposes of this Article such distinctions are completely
unimportant. All of the analysis and proposals made in this Article with respect to contributions in
aid of construction also apply to customer connection fees, and hereinafter the former term will
encompass both concepts.
156. For a study of these general practices involving General Motors, Ford, and their suppli-
ers, see Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration
In The Automobile Industry, 13 Bell J. Econ. 206, 207 (1982).
157. See Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 722 (1957), aff'd 254
F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1958), in which a corporation that collected cash contributions to construct such
an antenna was held to be taxable on the contributions. Under this Article's proposal, a corpora-
tion receiving cash to construct transaction-specific assets would not be taxed to the extent that
such cash was spent in the construction activities. To the extent, however, that firms received cash
in excess of costs they incurred to construct these assets, such excess amounts would be included
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Similarly, a corporation manufacturing a particular product might con-
tribute a sales building tc a person selling its product, with the building
to be used to facilitate the sales efforts. 158 The difference between this
type of contribution involving transaction-specific assets and contribu-
tions for economic development is that contributions for economic de-
velopment are typically not made by the governments in order to
engage in future transactions with the corporations, such as purchasing
goods or services. 159 Rather, the contributions are made simply for the
purpose of benefitting from the economic development provided by the
corporate presence in the area.
B. Illustrative Example: Transaction-Specific Asset
To illustrate these problems involving transaction-specific assets,
assume a manufacturing firm is determining hov to ship its manufac-
tured goods to customers. Assume that the firm has two alternatives in
shipping its goods. The firm can use a trucking service and ship the
goods over the public highways at a cost of $200,000 a year. This alter-
native involving the use of trucks to ship the goods does not require the
firm to make any initial capital investments; the annual payments of
$200,000 are the only expenditures required under this arrangement.
Under a second alternative, the firm could ship the goods using the
services of a railroad that owns and operates a rail line close to the
in their income and currently taxed.
158. See John B. White, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 729 (1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 989 (3d
Cir. 1972), in which a corporation receiving such a contribution was held to have recognized gross
income, thus increasing the corporation's federal income tax payments. See also note 54 for a dis-
cussion of cases involving contributions of land by developers to corporations, which are more akin
to payments for economic development, and hence are excluded from income.
159. Occasionally, state and local governments do provide bids to corporations as locational
incentives that include arrangements under which the government would be obligated to purchase
goods from the corporation at a later date. For example, the state of Texas made a recent bid to
retain a General Motors ("GM") plant in Arlington, Texas, by offering to purchase GM's
automobiles for the state fleet at a later date. Hornbeck, "Michigan to Match Texas in Bid to
Keep GM Plant," Gannett News Serv. (Jan. 15, 1992). The implications of these arrangements are
unclear. If Texas, for example, were to nbtain automobiles at a discount price from GM at a future
date, then the initial contribution made by Texas to GM would constitute prepaid income to GM.
Prepaid income is generally outside the scope of this Article, although I believe that present law
generally overtaxes GM by requiring the prepaid income to be recognized immediately when re-
ceived. See note 240. If, in contrast, Texas obligated itself to purchase automobiles from GM in the
future at an inflated price, then the amount of the excess price would be an additional contribution
made by Texas to GM as a inducement to settle. The discounted present value of the contribution
would be viewed as immediately received by GM, and would be excluded from its income. Nor-
mally, the growth in value of the contribution until it was actually received upon the purchase of
the automobiles would be taxable interest to GM. However, such interest might be excluded from
GM's income under I.R.C. § 103 (West 1992). In any event, these types of governmental bids,
involving future purchase obligations appear to occur quite infrequently, and thus do not represent
an important exception to the general practice described in the text.
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factory. The annual payments required if the firm chooses this rail al-
ternative are only $100,000 a year. However, to ship the goods using the
railroad requires the firm to construct a one-mile "spur" track from the
factory to the main rail line.16 The railroad refuses to extend rail ser-
vice to the factory unless the firm pays for the construction of this one-
mile rail spur.16 This spur track can be constructed by the firm for a
cost of $1 million. This spur track is useful to the firm only if it chooses
to ship its equipment over the rail line. The track is worthless for any
other function; thus the track's "salvage value" is zero.
16 2
The spur track is an example of a transaction-specific asset.
163
Here, the entire value of the track, once constructed, pertains to the
specific purpose of shipping equipment from the factory to the main
rail line. In this situation, the specificity of the asset is determined by
its location or site, i.e., "site specificity"."6 Because of the immobility of
the track, once the asset is constructed its value becomes highly specific
to the particular site where it is located. The asset has no value for use
in other sites, largely because of the cost of moving the asset.
1 65
Notice that by investing $1 million, the firm initially expects to re-
160. For a study of such arrangements, see Russell Pittman, Specific Investments, Con-
tracts, and Opportunism: The Evolution of Railroad Sidetrack Agreements, 34 J. Law & Econ.
565 (Oct. 1991). Although Pittman describes these structures as "sidetracks," id. at 567, I prefer
the alternate designation of "spur track" or "spur," Id. at 582.
161. Alternatively, the railroad could'construct the spur track itself, and recover the costs of
its investment by increasing the charges made to the manufacturing firm for transportation ser-
vices. Several reasons exist why the railroad might not pursue this approach. The railroad, for
example, might have difficulties raising the necessary capital to finance the construction of the
track; the manufacturing firm might be able to raise the capital more readily, at lower costs to the
firm. For a suggestion that this rationale plays a role in structuring these types of transactions for
utilities in general, see Letter and accompanying position paper from Public Service Commission
State of Florida, to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, J. Roger Mentz (Apr. 18, 1986) (on file
with author). Similarly, the railroad might not be willing to take the risk of investing in the track
and falling to receive an adequate return on its investment in the event the manufacturing firm
were to go out of business or were unable, for other reasons, to provide the railroad with sufficient
revenues to justify the railroad's investment. See Pittman, 34 J. Law & Econ. at 586, who suggests
that the ability of manufacturing firms to resort to other forms of transportation creates significant
risks for the railroad, thus resulting in the firms being required to construct these spur tracks
themselves. Moreover, in situations in which the corporation occupying the position of the railroad
was a regulated public utility, the regulatory rate structure governing the utility likely would pre-
vent the utility from selectively increasing rates to one customer to help pay for the cost of this
investment. Instead, the utility would be required to charge the same price per unit of service to
all customers, thus effectively preventing it from making specific investments tailored to the needs
of a particular customer.
162. For purposes of simplification, my example states the track's salvage value at zero. Al-
though certain costs of constructing the spur track may be irretrievable, metals and other materi-
als used in the construction may be salvageable for other purposes. Pittman, 34 J. Law & Econ. at
567.
163. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
164. Williamson, Antitrust Economics at 64 (cited in note 10).
165. Id. Compare note 162.
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duce its annual shipping costs from $200,000 to $100,000. Thus, the $1
million investment is earning a ten percent rate of return to the firm,
i.e., $100,000 a year.166 The firm will make this investment if alternative
uses of the $1 million would yield a rate of return inferior to the ten
percent rate available from the investment. Assume, for example, that
the next best alternative available to the firm, adjusting for the risk of
the particular investments,167 would provide an eight percent annual
rate of return to the firm, or $80,000 a year. The firm would then prefer
to construct the spur track, since the ten percent anticipated return on
the track exceeds the rate of return available from all competing invest-
ments. Notice also, assuming social rates of return equal private rates of
return,168 that the construction of the track is an economically efficient
investment, since the resources deployed in the track are earning a
higher rate of return in that form than in any other competing invest-
ment. Thus, economic wealth is generally increased if this investment is
made by the firm.1
69
Assume that the firm proceeds with the construction of the spur
track and ships its equipment using the railroad, paying the railroad
$100,000 for the service. In this example, the economic return from the
spur track is inuring to the benefit of the firm, not the railroad, in that
the firm is receiving the advantages of the lower rail rates in compari-
son to the higher rates charged for trucking. On first impression, the
railroad itself has no accretion to wealth from the construction of the
track, since the railroad simply continues to charge the market rate for
its services of $100,000 a year.1 ° This is the critical point regarding
166. For purposes of simplicity, I am assuming that the rail track has a permanent life, and
thus does not depreciate, nor require annual maintenance. The introduction of additional complex-
ities such as depreciation would not substantively alter the conceptual analysis in the text, but
rather would complicate the model and interfere with its clear presentation.
167. Since rates of return increase with the riskiness of a particular asset, adjustments for
differences in risk in order to assess the desirability of two different investments are necessary.
Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 277, 286-87 (1990).
168. The assumption that social rates of return equal private rates of return is simply an-
other way of saying that the assets in question do not produce externalities (either positive or
negative) that would cause their social values to deviatb from their private values. Rosen, Public
Finance at 62 (cited in note 4); Samuelson, Economics at 450 n.10 (cited in note 4) (discussing
private costs versus social costs); Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Inno-
vation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 367 (1989). For a
discussion of externalities, see note 4.
169. See Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism at 32 (cited in note 10), who
explains this gain in wealth by noting that "[a]ssets here are specialized to the particular needs of
the parties. Productive values would therefore be sacrificed if transactions of this kind were to be
prematurely terminated." See also Pittman, 34 J. Law & Econ. at 565 (cited in note 160), who
notes that the "[m]aximization of joint long-term profits in a purchaser-supplier relationship often
requires investment in assets that are in some way dedicated to the specific relationship".
170. Admittedly, the railroad may realize an accretion to wealth occurring from the acquisi-
1992] 1505
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1457
these types of transactions-the railroad does not have income from the
construction of the spur track by the manufacturing firm, because the
railroad will not be raising its prices (or lowering the quality of its ser-
vices and retaining the same prices) in response to the construction of
the track. Later, this Article discusses whether this assumption regard-
ing the railroad's behavior is generally reasonable. For now, the reader
should assume that this is the case and consider the resulting conse-
quence: The railroad does not experience an accretion to wealth by vir-
tue of the manufacturing firm constructing the track.
C. Treatment Under Present Law
The current federal income tax treatment of these transaction-spe-
cific assets depends on legal niceties surrounding the form in which the
parties arrange their affairs, rather than upon the substance of the ar-
rangement. If, in the example involving the manufacturing firm con-
structing the spur track, the firm retains legal ownership of the track
and does not convey the track to the railroad, the tax laws reach what is
generally the correct result-the firm is regarded as the owner of the
track and the railroad does not recognize taxable income from the
firm's investment in the track.17 1 Thus, no taxable income is generated
in such a situation; the firm capitalizes 172 its costs of constructing the
track and treats the track as any other asset used in its business.
173
Unfortunately, for primarily technological reasons,' 7 many trans
actions involving these types of assets follow a different pattern in
tion of a new customer committed to doing business with the railroad. For discussion of this point,
see notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
171. Since the manufacturing firm has not transferred property to the railroad, the railroad
will not recognize any income from the former party by constructing the spur track. For the impor-
tance of legal title in determining the taxation of these transactions, see IRS Notice 87-82 at 390
(cited in note 5).
172. The term "capitalize" is used to mean that the firm is not allowed to immediately de-
duct the costs of the expenditure in computing its taxable income, but rather is required to treat
these costs as creating a capital asset that has future value to the firm. Bittker and Lokken, 1
Taxation of Income at 1 20.4.1. (cited in note 3).
173. Thus, the manufacturing firm would be allowed to depreciate the costs of the rail track.
I.R.C. § 168 (West 1992).
174. For example, when these arrangements involve a utility and a prospective customer, the
customer may be required to transfer the asset to the utility in order that the utility may control
and monitor the integration of the asset into its utility "grid" or system. Thus, in order to protect
the integrity of the utility infrastructure, and to avoid the possibility of legal liabilities resulting
from a failure in the utility system, the utility receives the asset from the customer. See Letter
from Edison Electric Institute to Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel Dale S. Collinson 2 (Nov. 21,
1975) (on file with author) (stating that the "utility acquires ownership of the facility in name
only. The utility has a duty to retain this ownership for the benefit of the public in connection
with possible tort liability, continuity of title, and maintenance, repair, and replacement, in accor-
dance with regulatory standards."). For similar explanations involving closely analogous situations
involving transfers of properties to utilities, see Letter from Covington & Burling to Treasury Tax
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which title to the transaction-specific asset is transferred from one
party to the other. When such a transfer of the asset occurs, the tax
laws require the corporation receiving the asset to recognize income,
which I believe to be incorrect. 175 Assume, for example, that the firm
constructs the spur track and then transfers legal title to the track to
the railroad. In addition, assume that the arrangement between the
parties is otherwise unchanged; the firm continues to pay $100,000 to
the railroad for the annual services. Under current law, the railroad will
recognize $1 million in taxable income upon receipt of legal title to the
spur track.17 6 Moreover, the firm will still be required to capitalize the
costs of constructing the track as an asset,"' with no deduction allowed
to the firm by virtue of the transfer.7 8 As previously discussed, this
result is clearly incorrect; the railroad does not have an accretion to
wealth equal to $1 million. Indeed, subject to caveats discussed later,179
the railroad's accretion to wealth is equal to zero.180 The railroad does
not experience an accretion to wealth from receipt of the legal title to
the spur because the economic rate of return generated by the spur is
inuring to the manufacturing firm, not to the railroad. Accordingly,
Legislative Counsel Dennis Ross 1 (Feb. 19, 1988) (on file with author) (asserting that the transfer
of legal title occurs so that the utility prevents damage to its transmission system); Letter and
accompanying memorandum from Covington & Burling to Treasury Attorney Advisor Robert
Scarborough 8 (Apr. 8, 1988) (on file with author) (stating that the "utility demands access to, or
supervision and titular ownership" of asset to protect the integrity of the rest of the utility's sys-
tem). In other situations, transfer of title may be important in consolidating ownership of the
asset, so that licensing requirements and other transaction costs are minimized. One would infer,
for example, that such considerations were dominant in Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley v.
Commissioner, 27 T. C. at 723-24, in which a group of subscribers contributed the costs of con-
structing an antenna to a company, with the antenna to be used by the company in broadcasting
television to the subscribers. One can imagine that licensing requirements and other practical
problems would have been unmanageable if the individual subscribers had retained legal title to
the antenna and not transferred it to the company.
175. See IRS Notice 87-82 at 389-90 (cited in note 5). See also IRS Rev. Rul. 75-557, 1975-2
C.B. 33, which strongly implies that such a result would occur in the specific situation involving a
railroad. For the history surrounding Rev. Rul. 75-557, see Andrews Taxation at 333-36 (cited in
note 2).
176. IRS Notice 87-82 at 390 (cited in note 5) provides that the amount included in the
corporation's income in such a situation typically will be the "replacement cost" of the property
received. In the example discussed in the text, the replacement cost of the rail track would be
approximately $1 million, since the firm had recently constructed the track for that amount and
then immediately transferred it to the railroad.
177. See note 172 for the meaning of the term "capitalize."
178. See, for example, IRS Notice 87-82 at 392, which requires the firm to capitalize the cost
of the asset, with the firm then being allowed to depreciate (or amortize) the cost of the asset over
time, assuming certain conditions are met.
179. See notes 162-79 and accompanying text.
180. For more specific defenses of this position, see notes 194-96 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing situations in which the railroad is a monopolist), and notes 214-15 and accompanying text
(discussing situations in which the railroad might appropriate the asset for its own benefit).
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under this Article's proposals, taxpayers receiving contributions of
transaction-specific assets to be used in future transactions between
themselves and the contributor would exclude these contributions from
their income in their entirety.'8 '
This incorrect treatment of the railroad under present law is based
on the notion that the firm has prepaid the railroad in advance for ser-
vices the railroad will perform in the future.'82 Thus, this "prepaid in-
come" is immediately taxable to the railroad, upon receipt, even though
the income might not be "earned" until a later date. Here, again, the
law incorrectly characterizes this transaction. Although the railroad has
insisted, for various business reasons,"8 3 that the manufacturing firm
contribute the rail spur as a condition of the railroad providing services
to the firm, it is quite strained to insist that the value of the spur repre-
sents a prepayment by the firm to the railroad for services, and that the
railroad should be taxed on the fair market value of the spur. Rather,
the railroad has simply insisted that the customer bear the cost of con-
structing this spur, which is highly specific and specialized to a particu-
lar function, before the railroad will provide services to the firm at its
standard price. The fact that the firm is bearing the economic cost of
the spur does not mean that the railroad has an accretion to wealth
equal in amount to the fair market value of the spur. 184 In short, the
firm has not prepaid the railroad for services; the firm has simply in-
curred capital expenditures necessary for the railroad to provide future
services to the firm at its standard rates.
D. Effects of Overtaxation Under Present Law
This example illustrates the pernicious effects created by present
law's overtaxation of these transactions. Assuming that both the rail-
road and the firm are aware of the taxation of this transaction before it
occurs, the railroad will demand that the firm indemnify it for the taxes
181. Of course, if my proposals were adopted, firms excluding contributions of transaction-
specific assets from their income would have no tax basis in the assets. That is, having excluded
the receipt of such assets from their income, firms would not be allowed to depreciate or otherwise
recover any costs of those assets. See note 6 for a discussion of a similar rule that presently applies
to contributions received for economic development. For more specific defenses of this position, see
notes 194-96 and accompanying text (situations in which the railroad is a monopolist), and notes
214-15 and accompanying text (situations in which the railroad might appropriate the asset for its
own benefit).
182. See note 9.
183. Such reasons might include, for example, the relative abilities of the two parties to ob-
tain capital for the transaction, or the preference of the parties for bearing the risk of this invest-
ment. See note 161.
184. For a similar analysis, see the dissenting opinion of Tax Court Judge Kern in Teleser-
vice Co. of Wyoming Valley, 27 T.C. at 732-33.
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it pays upon receipt of the rail spur."" This indemnification amount
demanded by the railroad could be as high as $515,000.1se Thus, if this
were to occur, the firm would have to pay a total of $1,515,000 in order
to construct the spur and complete this transaction; $1 million in the
costs of constructing the track, and a $515,000 indemnification payment
made by the firm to the railroad.
Moreover, because of the overtaxation of this transaction, the firm
will now find it unattractive to construct the rail spur even though the
investment of capital in the rail spur was an economically efficient
transaction that resulted in an increase in wealth.18 7 The firm will not
construct the rail spur because the firm now will be required to invest
$1,515,000 in order to earn $100,000 a year, for an annual rate of return
equal to 6.6 percent. Now, comparing the 6.6 percent rate of return of-
fered by the rail spur with the eight percent rate of return available
from alternative projects results in the firm choosing the alternative
projects over the rail spur. Thus, the tax laws, by overtaxing these types
of transactions, may be creating a misallocation of resources by inap-
propriately lowering the rate of return from certain investments and
driving capital away from those particular areas of the economy.' s
E. Problems with My Proposals Regarding Transaction-Specific
Assets
Based on the foregoing analysis, I propose that corporations receiv-
ing contributions of transaction-specific assets should not recognize tax-
able income from the transactions. Instead, the tax laws should regard
the transaction as if the person contributing the asset to the corpora-
tion is still the economic owner of the asset. 8" Although, as discussed
below, this proposal is not perfect, it would substantially improve the
taxation of these contributions in comparison to the treatment under
present law.
185. See note 48. Admittedly, this assumes that the incidence of this tax is on the customer,
as opposed, for example, to the railroad's shareholders. See note 25 for a discussion of the inci-
dence of a tax.
186. For a discussion of how this amount is derived, see note 50.
187. Again, this assumes that social rates of return equal private rates of return, or, phrased
differently, that the railroad track would not have generated negative externalities that would
cause the social value of the track to be less than its private value. See note 168.
188. As previously discussed, any strong claims that this result was allocatively inefficient
would first have to resolve second best problems associated with such an argument. See note 53.
189. Thus, the person making the contribution would still continue depreciating the asset as
if it were still directly owned by that person. The corporation receiving the contributed asset
would treat the asset as if it were not owned by the corporation. For example, the tax basis to the
corporation of the contributed property would be zero. See note 6.
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Admittedly, situations would exist in which the railroad would real-
ize economic income from the construction of the track by the manufac-
turing firm. First, the railroad might experience economic income
simply from acquiring another customer to purchase its services, with
the manufacturing firm's construction of the track indicating the firm's
intention to become such a customer. Second, the railroad might be
able to "appropriate" the economic benefit of the track for the rail-
road's own use, as opposed to allowing the benefits of the track to inure
to the manufacturing firm. The following sections discuss both of these
possibilities, while explaining why neither presents fatal problems to
the general thesis that the railroad should not be taxed on this
transaction.
1. Acquisition of a New Customer
The conclusion that the railroad has no economic income from the
receipt of the spur track may be erroneous if the railroad is operating in
a market of imperfect competition and has an accretion to wealth by
obtaining the manufacturing firm as another customer. The important
point here is that the manufacturing firm, by constructing the spur
track, is signaling an intention and commitment to purchase future ser-
vices from the railroad at its standard prices.190 If the railroad was op-
erating in a perfectly competitive market within a state of equilibrium,
the railroad would have no immediate accretion to wealth upon receipt
of the asset. In such a market, the prices charged by the railroad to
customers for its services would exactly cover the railroad's costs of
generating those services, with costs being expansively defined to in-
clude a competitive rate of return to the shareholders of the railroad.191
Consequently, the railroad would not experience an immediate accre-
tion to wealth merely from a firm "signing-up" to purchase future ser-
vices from the railroad. This is because the prices charged to the firm
would not provide the railroad with an economic profit, but rather
would only cover the railroad's costs.
92
Assume, in contrast, that the railroad is not operating in a perfectly
competitive marketplace, but rather, that the railroad is a monopolist
or an oligopolist'9 ' and is able consistently to earn economic profits by
190. The fact that the asset is transferred to the railroad is largely irrelevant here. The initial
construction of the asset by the manufacturing firm, irrespective of whether the asset is trans-
ferred, is the critical point that signifies the intention of the firm to do future business with the
railroad.
191. Samuelson, Economics at 445-46 (cited in note 4).
192. Of course, in future years, as the railroad earns its normal competitive rate of return
from the new customer, it would recognize taxable income and be taxed accordingly. My point here
is that the railroad does experience an immediate accretion to wealth from the new customer when
the spur track is constructed.
193. See note 129. Such assumptions of monopoly or oligopoly power would have been war-
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charging higher prices for its services that reflect its market power.
Now, in such a situation, the railroad would experience economic in-
come from having a new customer commit to purchase future services
from the railroad, since the standard prices charged by the railroad re-
sult in the railroad earning oligopolist profits. That is, every new cus-
tomer acquired by the railroad at the railroad's standard prices for
services would increase the railroad's wealth, since each customer would
provide more revenues and profits to the railroad.1 94 Therefore, my ear-
lier conclusion that the railroad has no economic income from the
transaction would be incorrect.
This result does not, however, justify taxing the railroad upon the
receipt of the asset from the firm. In such a market, the railroad would
have economic income from any new customer that it acquired, irre-
spective of whether that new customer contributed a transaction-spe-
cific asset to the railroad. For example, assume a second manufacturing
firm opens a manufacturing plant that is located immediately adjacent
to the main rail line. Also assume that the second firm does not require
the construction of a spur track in order to use the railroad to ship its
manufactured product. In such a situation, the railroad would have eco-
nomic income merely from the addition of the second manufacturing
firm as a new customer. Thus, the construction of the transaction-spe-
cific asset is irrelevant to whether the railroad has income.'95 The rail-
road has income from both manufacturing firms intending to use its
future services, although only one firm contributed an asset to the rail-
ranted especially earlier in the nation's history when railroads occupied a unique position in the
transportation industry. In fact, railroads were regulated during those years in recognition of such
power. However, in modern times, this market power has been widely dissipated, with the trucking
industry and other nonrail competitors becoming increasingly important alternatives to rail
transportation.
194. An examination of the actual arrangements regarding spur tracks provides support for
the theory that the railroad benefits from the addition of a new customer. Based on Russell Pitt-
man's study of these arrangements, the customer typically is required to pay for the costs of con-
structing the track. However, the railroad will then refund or rebate to the customer the
construction costs so incurred, based on the amount of subsequent business provided the customer
by the railroad. See Pittman, 34 J. Law & Econ. at 573, 586-87 (cited in note 160). This suggests
that the railroad is in a situation of imperfect competition. The railroad would not be willing to
pay the firm for additional business in tue form of these refunds if the railroad's charges for that
business were set in a perfectly competitive market only covering the railroad's costs. However, in
this situation the contractual arrangement made by the parties reduces the amount of income
realized by the railroad upon its acquisition of a new customer. Although the new customer may
represent an asset to the railroad, the railroad has also incurred an offsetting liability in the form
of its obligation to refund the costs of the track to the customer over future periods. Thus, it
remains unclear as to whether the railroad experiences an accretion to wealth from its acquisition
of the customer, and if so, how the accretion should be measured.
195. The construction of the transaction-specific asset is not, however, irrelevant to the sepa-
rate issue of whether the railroad may have income by appropriating the quasi-rents generated by
the asset. For further discussion of this point, see notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
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road. Moreover, the amount of the economic income actually realized
by the oligopolist railroad would generally bear little, if any, relation to
the value of the transaction-specific asset contributed to the railroad.
For example, two manufacturing firms might become customers of the
railroad, with each firm representing the same amount of potential fu-
ture business to the railroad. Thus, the railroad would experience an
equal accretion to wealth from each firm. However, under present law,
if one firm contributed a track of one mile in length to the railroad,
with the second firm contributing a track two miles long, the railroad
would recognize twice the taxable income from the first contribution as
from the second contribution. In short, there is no administrable man-
ner in which present law could accurately tax the oligopolist railroad
from the income realized from acquiring another customer. The tax
laws reflect a recognition of this problem, in that they generally treat all
oligopolists in the same manner by allowing deferral of income recogni-
tion from the acquisition of new customers until subsequent periods
when those customers actually receive services from the oligopolist.196
Such an approach should be followed in this case as well, since the same
problems that have stymied present law's attempt to deal with the gen-
eral problem fully apply to this situation.
2. Appropriation of the Asset by the Railroad
The literature dealing with transaction-specific assets has recog-
nized that such assets have peculiar characteristics that create unusual
risks for their owners. These risks exist because these assets generate
"quasi-rents' 197 that are vulnerable to appropriation by other parties. A
196. This point is so deeply imbedded in the tax law that finding specific authority for its
validity is difficult. Inferentially, this result is implied by the tax law's treatment of firms incurring
advertising costs, which undoubtedly attracts new customers. Firms engaging in advertising are
allowed to deduct immediately the costs of such advertising, while deferring recognition of the
increase in wealth generated by the advertising until the wealth is actually "realized" by a subse-
quent increase in the firm's business. Graetz Taxation at 202-03, 359 (cited in note 2).
197. The term "pure economic rent" generally refers to the values (or returns) attached to
assets whose quantities are fixed (inelastic), and that can be used for only one purpose. Land that
is only useful for raising one type of crop is an asset having pure economic rent. Because their
owners have only one use for these assets, the assets will be employed in the economy regardless of
the returns paid to their owners for the assets. Samuelson, Economics at 526-27 (cited in note 4).
The term "quasi-rent" generally refers to values (or returns) attached to assets whose supply is
temporarily fixed (or temporarily inelastic). Id. at 527 n.3. Such assets generate rent-like returns,
because, during the phase when their quantity is fixed, their owners again are forced to take
whatever the market will pay for the assets. Due to the fact that transaction-specific assets, once
employed, are "locked-in" and are useful for a specific purpose (and to a lesser extent, for any
other purpose), the values of those assets takes on a character of rent (quasi-rent). With respect to
transaction-specific assets, the "quasi-rent" is defined as the value of the asset attributable to its
specialized fixed use. This amount is the difference between the value of the asset used for its most
productive purpose, and the value of the asset used for its second best purposes. If the asset is
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quasi-rent is simply an economic return or benefit provided by a partic-
ular asset that is attributable to its use in a specific, specialized func-
tion once the asset is committed to that function. If, for example, a
transaction-specific asset generates an economic benefit 9 8 of $100 a
year when the asset is committed to and subsequently used in a special-
ized function, and if that asset would yield only $30 a year when em-
ployed for any other use, then the $70 difference is a quasi-rent.
Another party could appropriate, for itself, a portion (or all) of the $70
quasi-rent, without causing the asset's owner to abandon the present
project and to use the asset for other purposes. Thus, if another party
were to appropriate $20 of the annual return from the asset, then $80
annually still would be available to the asset's owner. If this were to
occur, the owner would continue to use the asset for the same special-
ized function, because the $80 return actually available to the owner
would still exceed the $30 benefit available by employing the asset for
other purposes.
My assumption that the railroad, in the previous example, does not
have economic income from the construction of the spur track by the
manufacturing firm is based on the assumption that the railroad is not
able to appropriate any of the quasi-rents generated by the track. This
assumption is consistent with the underlying premise of the economics
literature regarding transaction-specific assets, that the quasi-rents gen-
erated from these transaction-specific assets will inure to the benefit of
the firm that makes the investment in the assets (the first party), unless
the other party to the transaction manages to "appropriate" some of
these quasi-rents for itself.199 Appropriation of the asset's quasi-rents
useful for no other purpose, then the quasi-rent will be the difference between the value of the
asset used for its most productive purpose and the salvage value of the asset. Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 298-99 (cited in note 10).
198. Such benefits might consist, for example, of additional revenue from a project, or a re-
duction of expenses incurred in the project.
199. See Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 298-99, for a numerical example
of this premise. For a sample of this premise reflected in the literature, see Joskow, 1 J. L. Econ. &
Org. at 37-39 (cited in note 10). For a discussion of the appropriation by other parties of quasi-
rents generated by transaction-specific assets, see Monteverde and Teece, 13 Bell J. Econ. at 206-
07 (cited in note 156) (discussing the organizational structure adopted by the automobile industry
to protect against the appropriation by other parties of quasi-rents resulting from specific invest-
ments); Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 265-66 (cited in note 10) (stating that idiosyncratic investments
generating quasi-rents in the rail freight industry result in contractual relationships designed to
prevent other parties from appropriating these rents); Scott E. Masten, The Organization of Pro-
duction: Evidence From the Aerospace Industry, 27 J. Law & Econ. 403, 405 (1984) (stating that
as specialization of assets increases in the aerospace industry, a similar increase occurs in organiza-
tional costs incurred to prevent appropriation of quasi-rents generated from these assets); William-
son, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism at 30-32 (cited in note 10) (discussing a tabular




will occur if the other party is able to raise the prices (or lower the
quality) of the services it provides to the first party, knowing that the
first party will be forced into accepting the new arrangement because it
is "locked into" the transaction by virtue of investing in the asset. If, in
contrast, the other party does not succeed in appropriating the quasi-
rents generated by the asset, then the investment in the transaction-
specific asset by the first party will not result in economic gain to the
other party. Economic gain does not inure to the other party because
the value of the asset, which consists of all future streams of the returns
generated by the asset,200 is economically enjoyed in total by the first
party.
If, in contrast, the railroad were able to appropriate some of the
quasi-rents generated from the asset, then, admittedly, taxing the rail-
road on its resulting accretion to wealth would be entirely proper.20 ' In
such a situation, the economic benefits of the asset would accrue to the
railroad, and hence the railroad would have increased its wealth by es-
sentially confiscating the asset without incurring an obligation to pay
for the property. This section of the Article discusses how an appropria-
tion might occur and illustrates the consequences of such an event.
Again, the economics literature provides substantial assistance in
analyzing this problem.20 2 Continuing with the previous example, the
railroad could appropriate the quasi-rents generated by the rail spur by
engaging in opportunistic behavior after the manufacturing firm had al-
ready constructed the spur. Risks of opportunism arise because the re-
lationship between the manufacturing firm and the railroad consists of
a bilateral monopoly, defined to mean a situation in which the parties
to a transaction view each other as the only available person with which
to conduct the transaction.203 Bilateral monopolies arise from transac-
tion-specific assets, because the nature of these assets ensures that a
continuing, ongoing relationship exists between the two parties, and
that the parties cannot sever this relationship witho t incurring a sig-
nificant economic cost. In the case involving the firm and the railroad,
the abandonment of the relationship between the two parties would ne-
cessitate the abandonment of the spur rail line, since the line has no
value for any other purpose.
200. The value of any asset is nothing more than the discounted present value of its future
cash flows. Since the quasi-rents make up all of the cash flow of this asset, all of the asset's value
consists of the present value of the quasi-rents.
201. If the railroad were not currently taxed on its accretions to wealth, then it would be able
to defer the payment of tax, which would provide substantial benefits to the railroad. See note 6.
202. See note 10.
203. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism at 32, 61-63 (cited in note 10).
For a general example of a bilateral monopoly with one buyer and one seller, see Bronfenbrenner,
Sichel, and Gardner, Economics at 621 (cited in note 69).
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This characteristic of transaction-specific assets renders the firm
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the railroad, in that the rail-
road might raise the price charged to the firm for rail service (or lower
the quality of the service) and thereby "hold-up" the firm. Assume, for
example, that the railroad waits until the firm constructs the rail spur
line, and then raises the rates for rail service from $100,000 a year to
$160,000 a year. Having incurred a sizable investment in the transac-
tion-specific asset and having entered into a bilateral relationship with
the railroad, the firm will choose to pay the railroad $160,000 a year,
rather than pay trucking firms $200,000 a year. Note, however, that if
the firm had anticipated this opportunistic behavior ex ante, it would
not have constructed the rail spur. After the railroad's opportunistic
behavior, the $1 million investment in the rail spur resulted in a savings
of only $40,000 a year to the firm (not $100,000, as anticipated), yield-
ing a four percent annual rate of return. This four percent rate of re-
turn is inferior to the eight percent rate of return that was available to
the firm from other investments. Thus, if the firm had contemplated, ex
ante, that the railroad would raise its prices for services to $160,000, the
firm would have chosen to ship its equipment by truck for $200,000 a
year. Because, however, the firm lacked perfect information regarding
the future,2 °' it failed to anticipate that the railroad would engage in
this opportunistic behavior. Ex post, the firm will continue to use the
railroad, since the marginal costs it will incur shipping over the rails is
still less than the cost of using the highway.
In this example, by raising its rates to $160,000, the railroad essen-
tially has appropriated, for its own economic benefit, some of the quasi-
rents generated by the rail spur, the transaction-specific asset.0 5 The $1
million asset is generating, in its entirety, a ten percent rate of return
every year, or $100,000. The railroad, however, has appropriated
$60,000 of this return for its own benefit, by raising its rates by $60,000
each year. The firm retains the remaining $40,000 rate of return by us-
ing the asset to ship its equipment on the railroad at a cost of $40,000
204. That is, the firm possessed "bounded rationality" regarding future events. See William-
son, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism at 30-32.
205. Moreover, the amount of increase in the railroad's wealth by virtue of the customer's
construction of the rail spur would vary, depending on what percentage of the quasi-rents thrown
off by the rail spur were appropriated by the railroad. The railroad could, for example, raise its
annual rates from $100,000 to $199,999.99 (an amount short of the price charged by the trucking
industry). Under such a scenario, the railroad would have appropriated all of the quasi-rents from
the rail spur to its own benefit. In such a situation, it would be appropriate for the railroad to
recognize taxable income equal to the present value of the quasi-rents appropriated by the rail-
road, or, roughly speaking, $1 million. Present law requires this treatment of the railroad, assum-
ing that ownership of the rail spur is transferred to the railroad upon its completion. This
treatment under present law, however, is only correct if the railroad is successful in appropriating
all of the quasi-rents attributable to the asset.
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less than the cost it would incur by trucking the equipment. By appro-
priating some of the quasi-rents from the transaction-specific asset, the
railroad has experienced an accretion to wealth by virtue of the firm
constructing the rail spur. In effect, the railroad now is experiencing the
benefits of owning part of the asset, and thus, should be viewed as the
economic owner of that portion of the asset for all purposes of the tax
law.210 The railroad should be taxed on.its increase in wealth from par-
ticipating in the transaction. This tax would equal the present value of
the $60,000 annual stream of quasi-rents which the railroad has man-
aged to appropriate from the firm, or $600,000. Consequently, as a pol-
icy matter, the proper treatment of the railroad would be for it to
include $600,000 in income upon the construction of the rail spur by the
customer.
a. Recognition of Loss from Appropriation and Substitute
Taxation
Moreover, in the event that the railroad recognizes taxable income
by virtue of such an appropriation, the manufacturing firm should be
allowed to recognize a corresponding loss, which the firm would deduct
from its gross income. Since the manufacturing firm has invested $1
million, and since $600,000 of that investment has been siphoned off by
the railroad through opportunistic behavior, the firm should be allowed
to recognize a loss of $600,000. If the firm is not allowed a loss of
$600,000, then the tax system is, in the aggregate, overtaxing this trans-
action. Only $1 million of value is present in the asset-if the railroad
appropriates $600,000 of that value, then the manufacturing firm's
share of the value cannot be more than $400,000. Requiring the railroad
to recognize income of $600,000, while disallowing any loss recognition
by the firm, improperly treats the asset as if it had a value of
$1,600,000, not $1 million, and thus, overtaxes the parties. The reader
should note that present law requires the railroad to include the full $1
million in income, while disallowing any deduction at all to the manu-
facturing firm, thus, overtaxing the transaction in an especially egre-
gious fashion.07
The argument that the manufacturing firm should be allowed to
recognize a loss equal in amount to the income recognized by the rail-
road has important implications for tax policy. In the unusual case in
206. Thus, the railroad would be allowed to depreciate the amount of the asset it has appro-
priated, after including that same amount in its taxable income.
207. See note 178 for a discussion of present law's requirement that the manufacturing firm
capitalize, and not deduct, the cost of the track. In effect, present law treats the asset as if its value
were $2,000,000, not $1,000,000.
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which the railroad manages to appropriate a portion of the rents gener-
ated by the transaction-specific asset, the railroad should be required to
include in income the value of the asset that it has appropriated. How-
ever, not requiring the railroad to include this amount in income could
be justified, roughly speaking, if the manufacturing firm were not al-
lowed to deduct a loss from the transaction. That is, undertaxing the
railroad might be justified, as a policy matter, by overtaxing the manu-
facturing firm ("substitute taxation"). 0 8 Under certain assumptions, 09
no adverse policy results will occur if the manufacturing firm's taxation
serves as a substitute for the taxation that would otherwise apply to the
railroad.
Indeed, I believe that administrative concerns force one to adopt
substitute taxation as the governing rationale in this area. Due to
problems of complexity,210 it would be virtually impossible for the gov-
ernment to operate a tax system that taxed each railroad (or other tax-
payers in a comparable position) by requiring income inclusion of the
particular fraction of the asset's value that had been appropriated,
while allowing the manufacturing firm (or other comparable taxpayers)
to deduct the same amount as a loss. Instead, for administrative pur-
poses, an "all or nothing" approach needs to be adopted-either all of
the asset's value is included in the railroad's income and deducted by
the firm, or, alternatively, the railroad recognizes no income and the
firm sustains no loss. The current system, which requires the railroad to
208. The overtaxation of the manufacturer is a substitute for the undertaxation of the rail-
road. Substitute taxation may be adopted as a second best approach when the more optimal solu-
tion of properly taxing each party is impracticable or otherwise unattainable. For a discussion of
the substitute taxation rationale, see Halperin, 95 Yale L. J. at 517-18 (cited in note 7). Compare
Scarborough, 69 Taxes at 803 (cited in note 153) (noting the deficiencies of such an approach).
Basically, substitute taxation may be seen as a logical extension of the Coase theorem. R. H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). In order to achieve proper taxation of the
overall transaction, the proper amount of tax must be assessed on one of the parties. The particu-
lar identity of the party who is taxed is not particularly important, since presumably, the contrac-
tual terms between the two parties will be appropriately altered to reflect the particular allocation
of the tax burden. For a discussion of some of the important limitations of the Coase theorem, as
used to justify substitute taxation, see note 209.
209. The primary assumption necessary for substitute taxation to function properly as a
mechanism of tax policy is that both parties will be subject to the same marginal rate of tax. For
example, if both parties are subject to a 34% marginal tax rate, then overstating the manufactur-
ing firm's income by $1,000 will overtax the firm by $340, thus serving as an appropriate substitute
for understating the railroad's income by $1,000 which results in $340 of tax benefit for the rail-
road. However, if the manufacturing firm is subject to a marginal tax rate of zero (for example, the
firm is tax-exempt), then overtaxing the firm as a way of substituting for the undertaxation of the
railroad will not work. The government will lose an aggregate $340 of tax to the government, be-
cause the $340 of tax reduction obtained by the railroad is not offset by $340 of tax increase
suffered by the manufacturing firm. For recognition of this point, see Halperin, 95 Yale L. J. at 518
(cited in note 7).
210. For a previous discussion of complexity concerns, see note 24.
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include one-hundred percent of the asset's value, while prohibiting the
firm from recognizing any loss whatsoever, is truly indefensible.
Because appropriation of quasi-rents by the railroad is relatively
unusual,21' I believe that of the two alternatives, the more accurate ap-
proach would have the railroad recognize no income and the firm sus-
tain no loss upon the construction of the transaction-specific asset. This
approach is not perfect, however, and in some situations the railroad
will undoubtedly succeed in appropriating a portion of the asset's
quasi-rents. If this occurs, my proposal would undertax the railroad.
However, my proposal would similarly overtax the firm and therefore
would achieve a measure of substitute taxation, which is all that can be
hoped for in a necessarily imperfect world.212
b. The Economic Irrelevance of Legal Title
Another important point needs to be made here. The reader should
note that the determination as to whether the railroad appropriates the
quasi-rents from the asset is independent of whether legal title to the
rail spur was transferred to the railroad. That is, the ability of the rail-
road to raise the prices of its service, knowing that the manufacturing
firm is "locked-in" to future dealings with the railroad, is determined
by factors other than the identity of the party owning the rail spur. The
relevant point about the rail spur is simply that it represents an invest-
ment that has already been made, and that it has no value for use in
other functions. These characteristics of the rail spur create the oppor-
tunity for the railroad to hold-up the manufacturing firm by raising
prices-not the identity of the party having legal title to the rail. Thus,
the requirement of present law that the transaction-specific asset be
transferred to-the corporate recipient in order to trigger income is eco-
nomically irrelevant to the correct analysis of the situation. Moreover,
present law's emphasis on the transfer of legal title puts immense pres-
sure on this particular issue, in that some firms may be able to avoid
transferring legal title and thus avoid tax liability, while other firms
may not be able to avoid such a transfer and suffer harsh tax treatment
as a result.21 3 The fact that present law is operating in this capricious
211. For defense of this point, see notes 216-30 and accompanying text.
212. Substitute taxation will be especially ineffective in dealing with situations in which gov-
ernments transfer transaction-specific assets to firms, and those firms appropriate the quasi-rents
generated by the assets. Substitute taxation will not work in such a situation because of the tax.
exempt status of the governments. See note 209.
213. The IRS is fully aware of the importance of title in this area of the law, and has done
everything in its power to prevent firms from deliberately refraining from transferring title in an
attempt to lower their tax liabilities. For example, the IRS has publicly stated that parties who
refrain from transferring title to transaction-specific assets, but who engage in certain economic
arrangements involving these assets, will be treated as if legal ownership of the assets was effec;
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and arbitrary manner is another reason to reform the taxation of these
transactions.
c. The Likelihood of Appropriation
Before the manufacturing firm decides to construct the rail spur, it
likely will be aware of the possibility that the railroad might engage in
opportunistic behavior and appropriate quasi-rents from the rail spur.
The firm will therefore avoid entering into this transaction unless it
feels that it is protected from the opportunistic behavior. If the firm
believes it is vulnerable to the railroad appropriating the rents, then the
firm would not construct the spur, and instead would rely on the truck-
ing industry to ship the goods from the factory to the firm's
customer. 14
Thus, the firm will only engage in this transaction and construct
the rail spur if it believes that the quasi-rents from the spur will inure
to its benefit and not to the railroads. " "s To the extent that the firm's
belief proves to be an accurate prediction of the future, the railroad will
be prevented from appropriating the quasi-rents and it would be incor-
rect to tax the railroad for participating in this transaction. The firm
might construct the rail spur by different mechanisms and be protected
against appropriation by the railroad.
i. Protection Against Appropriation by Utility Regulation
The economics literature dealing with transaction-specific assets
has recognized that regulation of rates, occurring in the public utility
industry, is one way that firms making investments in transaction-spe-
cific assets are protected from other parties appropriating the economic
benefit of those assets.216 This is an especially important point because,
tively transferred, thus triggering tax consequences to the recipient. IRS Notice 87-82 at 390 (cited
in note 5). Although this position of the IRS may be subject to challenge, it certainly indicates the
tensions and problems inherent in the legal title issue, an issue that is irrelevant to a proper eco-
nomic analysis of the issue, but upon which a tremendous amount is based.
214. Technically, the firm would truck its goods, as opposed to ship its goods over rail, if the
railroad were able to appropriate enough of the spur track's quasi-rents to reduce the firm's rate of
return from its investment in the track to a level below what would be available to the firm from
alternative investments.
215. See notes 239-45 and accompanying text for discussion of a scenario in which both par-
ties deliberately plan a transaction intended to transfer the asset to the corporate recipient (the
railroad).
216. See, for example, Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J.
Econ. 426, 439-41 (1976) (discussing the role of rate regulation in protecting parties from being
"held up" by others after those parties make investments in specialized ass ts); Williamson, 22 J.
L. & Econ. at 257-58 (cited in note 10) (noting the importance of regulation in preserving expecta-
tions in natural monopolies involving significant investments in transaction-specific assets). Thus,
this literature represents a new perspective on regulation that recognizes the positive role that
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as previously mentioned, many of these transactions occurring in our
economy involve contributions by private parties of transaction-specific
assets to regulated public utilities. Typically, customers (or prospective
customers) contribute transaction-specific assets (such as lines or mains
for water, natural gas, or electricity) that the utility will use to provide
utility services to the customers in the future.
The regulatory treatment of these contributions by public utilities
helps ensure that the quasi-rents generated by the transaction-specific
assets inure to the benefit of the customer, and not the utility. In short,
as explained below, the regulatory environment applicable to public
utilities is designed to prevent the utility from raising its prices (or low-
ering the quality of its services) in response to the investment in the
transactionspecific asset by the customer. Thus, this treatment ensures
that the utility does not experience an accretion to wealth by virtue of
receiving the asset. Therefore, taxing the utility for participating in this
transaction would be inappropriate.
A utility receiving a contribution of a transaction-specific asset is
required by regulatory authorities to account for this asset as if it were
not owned by the utility. 1 The prices charged by utilities to customers
for utility services consist of two different elements: (i) a reimburse-
ment of the expenses the utility incurs in providing services to custom-
ers (e.g., salaries, depreciation, taxes) and (ii) a rate of return on the
capital invested in the utility.1 Nothing else typically enters into the
determination of prices utilities are allowed to charge customers for ser-
vices provided. Utilities are unable to appropriate the quasi-rents gen-
erated by transaction-specific assets, because under general regulatory
principles, transaction-specific assets are excluded from both of the
items mentioned above that determine the prices charged for services,
regulation plays in the nation's economy. In the past, regulation was heavily criticized for various
reasons, such as providing undue benefits to the regulated industry at the expense of consumers in
general. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly And Its Regulation, 21 Stan. L.
Rev. 548, 635 (1969) (criticizing regulation on the dual grounds that the problems of monopoly are
exaggerated and that regulation is largely ineffectual in dealing with those problems).
217. This reflects the proper economic understanding of the transaction in which the utility
is not able to appropriate the quasi-rents generated by the asset. The real economic owner of the
asset is the utility's customer, regardless of where legal title to the asset rests. If the utility were
treated as the owner of the asset, then the economic investment in the asset would be included in
the utility's rate base. The utility would earn a rate of return on the economic investment and the
prices charged to the utility's customers would increase. See note 218. Similarly, the depreciation
of the asset would be viewed as an expense incurred by the utility with respect to which the utility
would be reimbursed by its customers. See notes 218-20 and accompanying text. Since neither of
these two conventions are adopted for this asset, the utility is treated as if it does not own the
asset.
218. See Posner, 21 Stan. L. Rev. at 592 (cited in note 216).
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i.e., the utility's reimbursable expenses and rate of return.2 1 Thus, by
excluding the transaction-specific assets from these two factors, the reg-
ulatory authorities prevent the utilities from raising their rates in re-
sponse to the receipt of transaction-specific assets, or earning any
profits from the assets.220
Phrased differently, utilities are prevented by regulatory authori-
ties from engaging in opportunism with respect to transaction-specific
assets, because utilities are not allowed selectively to increase rates to a
particular customer to appropriate the quasi-rents being generated by
the assets. The regulatory requirement that the utility charge to all cus-
tomers the same price for each unit of utility services has the effect of
protecting the customer from opportunistic behavior and insuring that
the economic benefit resulting from the contributed asset inures to the
benefit of the customer. 21
Thus, in the case of regulated utilities, a strong argument exists
that contributions of transaction-specific assets should not be taxed to
the utility receiving those contributions, because the utility does not
experience an accretion to wealth from such transactions.
ii. Protection Against Appropriation by Nonregulated Market
Arrangements
My proposal, however, would go beyond the regulated sector to ex-
clude all contributions of transaction-specific assets from the recipient's
taxable income, even if the transaction was consummated in a nonregu-
lated environment.22 For example, railroads generally have been "de-
219. See Price Waterhouse, The Tax Aspects of Contributions in Aid of Construction 7
(Price Waterhouse 1991); Letter from Edison Electric Institute to Tax Legislative Counsel Dale
Collinson 2 (Nov. 21, 1975) (on file with author). Congress implicitly recognized the importance of
this regulatory treatment of transaction-specific assets, prior to the 1986 Act, by requiring such
treatment in the Internal Revenue Code as a condition to the utilities being allowed to exclude
these contributions from their income. See Section 118(b)(1)(C) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
(defining contributions in aid of construction as, inter alia, amounts excluded from the utility's
rate base).
220. Moreover, regulatory controls and monitoring of the utility prevent the utility from re-
ducing the quality of service provided to customers while maintaining the same price. Compare
Posner, 21 Stan. L. Rev. at 593-94 (cited in note 216) (acknowledging the existence of controls over
the quality of such services, but expressing doubts as to the practical ability of regulators to police
these controls).
221. See Goldberg, 7 Bell. J. Econ. at 440 (cited in note 210) (discussing regulatory policies
that are based on the overall operations of the firm and not individual services); Posner, 21 Stan.
L. Rev. (cited in note 216) (noting this phenomenon of charging customers the same price per unit
of service, but criticizing it as failing to reflect the differing cost of serving customers in various
areas of the country).
222. See notes 156-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of contributions of transaction-
specific assets in a nonregulated environment.
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regulated" and are no longer subject to strict rate regulation.22 3 Thus, in
the previous example involving the manufacturing firm constructing a
rail spur in order to ship its goods over rail, rate regulations would not
prevent the railroad from appropriating the quasi-rents generated by
the spur track. Nevertheless, the railroad should not be taxed on the
receipt of the spur track from the manufacturing firm.
My position is based on the considerable amount of evidence sug-
gesting that parties in the nonregulated sector will take steps to prevent
the appropriation of quasi-rents, in a manner similar to the mechanisms
existing in the regulated sector.2 4 Specifically, several studies of partic-
ular industries suggest that parties in those industries have adopted va-
rious arrangements to prevent the appropriation of quasi-rents
generated from transaction-specific assets. 225 For example, parties mak-
ing investments in transaction-specific assets will enter into elaborate
long-term contracts that will govern the future prices set by the rail-
road (or comparable firms) to the manufacturing firm (or comparable
firms) to protect against the possibility of appropriation of the quasi-
rents.26 Other phenomena, such as a firm's concern over its reputa-
tion,227and the desire of a firm to continue a business relationship with
a particular customer,228 also may significantly discourage firms from
223. Such deregulation was accomplished in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Re-
form Act, 90 Stat. 31 (1976), and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980). For a discus-
sion of the effects of these acts, see James M. MacDonald, Railroad Deregulation, Innovation, and
Competition: Effects of the Staggers Act on Grain Transportation, 32 J. L. & Econ. 63, 64-65
(1989).
224. In fact, this is the basic theme of transaction cost economics and its treatment of trans-
action-specific assets. The presence of potentially appropriable quasi-rents from transaction-spe-
cific assets leads to increased transaction costs, as parties create particular economic structures
and relationships for the purpose of decreasing the risk of appropriation. See, for example, Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 325-26 (cited in note 10); Williamson, 22 J. L. & Econ.
at 234 (cited in note 10).
225. Seefor example, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 308-13 (automobile
and petroleum industries); Monteverde and Teece, 13 Bell J. Econ. 206 (cited in note 156) (auto-
mobile industry); Masten, 27 J. L. & Econ. 403 (1984) (cited in note 199) (aerospace industry);
Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 265 (cited in note 10) (rail industry); Joskow, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 33
(cited in note 10).
226. See Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism at 75-77 (cited in note 10);
Douglas G. Baird, Self Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 583,
585 (1990); Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 302-07 (cited in note 10).
227. See Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 276 (cited in note 10) (discussing the attempt by the
railroad companies to preserve their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness in order to induce
others to invest in transaction-specific assets); Williamson, 22 J. L. & Econ. at 240-41 (cited in
note 10) (discussing the importance of personal and institutional trust between parties participat-
ing in specialized, idiosyncratic exchanges).
228. See Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 274-75 (cited in note 10); Klein, Crawford,cnd Alchian,
21 J. L. & Econ. at 303 (cited in note 10) (asserting that the withdrawal of future business, or the
loss of goodwill, provides a significant deterrent to opportunistic behavior); R. H. Coase, The Na-
ture of the -Firm: Influence, 4 J. L. Econ. & Org. 33, 44 (1988)
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attempting to appropriate these quasi-rents, even when such behavior
might be legally defensible because of loopholes and ambiguities in con-
tracts.229 Thus, to the extent that these contractual arrangements and
other phenomena function as described above, taxing the corporations
upon receipt of these transaction-specific assets is inappropriate, be-
cause those corporations have not been successful in appropriating the
assets' quasi-rents.
Finally, strong evidence suggests that a firm will deal with situa-
tions that present extremely serious risks of appropriation by "verti-
cally integrating" or "internalizing" the particular economic functions.
This eliminates the risk of appropriation of transaction-specifid as-
sets.23 0 Thus, the firm will perform the particular economic activity it-
self, with its own personnel and facilities, instead of accomplishing the
activity by contracting with other parties. This protects the firm from
the risk that other parties will appropriate its assets. Moreover, verti-
cally integrating or internalizing a particular economic function also
eliminates the tax problems relating to these transaction-specific assets.
After integration, there is no longer any risk that one party will be
taxed inappropriately on investments made by another party in trans-
action-specific assets, since the economic functions involving these as-
sets are now conducted by only one firm. This is another factor in favor
of the argument that appropriation of transaction-specific assets occurs
on an infrequent basis. The situations that do, in fact, pose the most
likely risks of appropriation are removed from the market altogether,
thus not presenting any issue for the tax laws to resolve.
3. Inevitable Inaccuracies of this Article's Proposals
In some situations, these various protective devices may fail, and
firms may succeed in increasing their wealth by engaging in opportunis-
tic behavior. The response to this problem is two-fold. First, this result
can be defended by noting the presence of substitute taxation, previ-
ously mentioned. 23' That is, although the firms that successfully appro-
229. See Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 276 (discussing arrangements designed to protect trans-
action-specific assets from appropriation, which were honored by the participating parties, al-
though not legally enforceable); Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 303-04
(discussing reliance on legally nonenforceable practices).
230. This point is one of the paradigms of the economics literature on transaction costs, and
has been both proposed as a theoretical construct of economic behavior and empirically tested by
observing actual industries. See, for example, Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capital-
ism at 78, 105-06 (cited in note 10); Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 21 J. L. & Econ. at 298-302
(cited in note 10); Masten, 27 J. L. & Econ. at 416-17 (cited in note 199); Monteverde and Teece,
13 Bell J. Econ. at 212 (cited in note 156); Palay, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 278; Joskow, 4 J. L. Econ. &
Org. at 104-11 (cited in note 10).
231. See notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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priated these quasi-rents would be undertaxed under this Article's
taxation proposals, the party on the other side of the transaction would
be overtaxed by the same amount. Clearly, substitute taxation is not a
perfect solution to this problem: it is especially ineffective in situations
involving transfers of transaction-specific assets from governments
(which are tax-exempt) to corporations (which are fully subject to
tax).23 2 However, substitute taxation is a more attractive mechanism in
achieving the right policy result than available alternatives in this par-
ticular situation.3 3 Second, I would note that administrative problems
generally result in our tax system not imposing immediate tax on accre-
tions to wealth experienced by persons who make "bargain
purchases '24 or who otherwise enter into advantageous contracts with
others.3 5 Instead, taxation is deferred until some later event, such as a
subsequent sale of the property by the initial purchaser.2 6 Immediately
taxing a firm that manages to increase its wealth by appropriating
quasi-rents that will be received by the firm in the future37 is analo-
gous to taxing persons on bargain purchases when those purchases ini-
tially occur-in both situations, parties are immediately taxed on
advantageous contractual provisions that may result from their hard
bargaining or shrewd negotiating. Although foregoing current taxation
232. For a discussion of this problem, see note 209. Unfortunately, there are transactions
that fit this pattern and which would not be remedied by substitute taxation.
233. Such alternatives consist of (i) impossibly complex schemes to tax corporations based on
the exact degree of asset appropriation that has occurred in that particular situation; and (ii) tax-
ing all corporations on the entire value of transaction-specific assets that they receive from others
(as in present law). The second alternative is substantially more inaccurate than the proposals
made in this text.
234. For a general discussion of the exclusion of bargain purchases from income, see Dodge,
45 Tax L. Rev. at 680-81 (cited in note 11). See also note 235.
235. If a person, through either skill or good luck, manages to purchase property from an-
other at a price below its fair market value, the purchaser is not required to immediately include
the bargain element in income. Bittker and Lokken, Taxation of Income at 5-78 (cited in note 3);
Sanford M. Guerin and Philip F. Postlewaite, Problems and Materials in Federal Income Taxa-
tion (Little Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1988) (discussing the contrast between nontaxable bargain
purchases obtained by negotiating with strangers, and taxable bargain purchases intended to be
compensatory). Generally, taxing persons on economic advantages they obtain in bargain
purchases would be inadministrable; difficulties of valuation, liquidity, and enforcement would
make this an impossible task. See Bittker and Lokken, Federal Income Taxation at 5-24 through
5-26 (discussing reasons for not taxing imputed income), 5-16 through 5-17 (discussing reasons for
not taxing unrealized gains) (cited in note 3).
236. If the value of the property remains higher than its initial cost to the purchaser, then a
subsequent sale of the property by the purchaser will result in taxable gain, because the amount
realized in the sale will exceed its tax basis. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1992).
237. A firm that, through opportunistic behavior, manages to raise prices charged to a cus-
tomer by appropriating the customer's transaction-specific asset has an immediate accretion to
wealth equal to the discounted present value of all future price increases that it will collect because
of the appropriation. However, under this Article's proposals, this immediate accretion in income
would not be recognized until later years as those higher prices were actually collected by the firm.
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of this income is not optimal, it is virtually required in light of the ad-
ministrative complexities that would result if our tax system attempted
to tax these accretions to wealth as they currently accrue.
2 38
4. Possibilities of Abuse
The possibility that this Article's taxation proposals would lead to
wide-scale abuse in the nonregulated sector of the economy needs to be
addressed. If the law were changed to allow contributions of transac-
tion-specific assets to be made tax-free to the recipient corporation,
parties might collaborate and deliberately engage in such transactions
for purposes of obtaining tax benefits. That is, firms and their custom-
ers might deliberately structure transactions in which customers paid
the firms for services in the form of transaction-specific assets. The re-
sponse to this problem is that the nature of these particular assets
largely eliminates the possibility of abuse in this area.
First, it should be noted that this scenario is radically different
from the situation portrayed in the economics literature regarding ap-
propriation of transaction-specific assets. In that literature, appropria-
tion occurs if a firm manages to raise the prices it charges another party
in response to that other party investing in a transaction-specific asset.
The investment in the asset allows the firm to "hold-up" the other
party by raising prices and thereby siphoning off some Of the returns
generated by the asset.239 In contrast, when a customer and firm delib-
erately plan for the customer to pay the firm in the form of a transac-
tion-specific asset that will be used in future transactions between the
two parties, the customer's investment in the asset leads to a decrease
in the prices the firm charges the customer, not an increase.240
Thus, in the previous example involving the manufacturing firm
constructing a rail spur, the firm will not willingly invest in the rail spur
and contribute that asset to the railroad knowing that the prices
charged to the firm will increase as a result of the contribution. Instead,
such a contribution would be made only if the firm and railroad had
agreed that the prices charged to the firm by the railroad would de-
238. See note 235 for discussions of the reasons for not taxing bargain purchases, including
administrative concerns over complexity.
239. See notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
240. For recognition of this point, see Halperin, 95 Yale L. J. at 515-19 (cited in note 7)
(discussing prepayments for goods and services, and noting that one would prepay $100 for a ser-
vice worth more than $100 that would be received later), and Scarborough, 69 Taxes at 800-02
(cited in note 153). The reason for this phenomenon is simple. A customer will not knowingly
prepay a corporation for goods or services the corporation is to provide in the future, unless the
customer obtains some advantage from the prepayment (for example, lower prices for the goods or
services provided). Absent any such advantage, the customer would wait and pay the corporation
at a later date, when those goods or services were actually provided.
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crease as a result of the contribution. This suggests that the railroad
does not have economic income from receiving the spur track. Instead,
the value of the track is immediately offset by the railroad's agreement
that it will provide services to the firm at a lower price than what would
otherwise apply.24' Moreover, in such a situation, the firm and the rail-
road are akin to persons participating in a joint endeavor involving co-
ownership of property.2 42 The firm has invested in the rail spur, and the
railroad has invested in the remaining assets of the railroad.243 The
firm's return from its investment in the rail spur is in the form of lower
241. Admittedly, this same point applies to firms receiving payment from customers in ad-
vance of providing services to those customers ("prepaid income"). See note 9. Although differ-
ences exist between prepaid income and the situation described in the text involving contributions
of transaction-specific assets, see note 244, they do share at least one common element-the recipi-
ent party is generally overtaxed under present law. That is, firms receiving prepaid income are
generally required to include the amounts in income when received, even though such treatment
results in overtaxation of the recipient party. For recognition of this point, see Halperin, 95 Yale L.
J. at 517 n.38 (cited in note 7); Scarborough, 68 Taxes at 801, 808-09 (cited in note 153) (noting
that the correct system would not tax the seller on receipt of income, and contrasting that with
present law that typically does apply such a tax); Evans, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 1192-93 (cited in note
24); Sneed, 17 Stan. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 2) (criticizing rules requiring immediate inclusion
of prepaid income as overstating the recipient's income). But see Surrey, et al., Federal Income
Taxation at 630-31 (cited in note 9) (defending this rule on the basis of administrative concerns
such as taxpayer liquidity and valuation). A corporation receiving prepaid income for services the
corporation will later provide to a customer is essentially borrowing money from the customer. The
corporation repays the loan when it provides the services, at a later date, to the customer. At this
later point, the corporation actually realizes the economic income from the transaction, not before.
Halperin, 95 Yale L. J. at 516; Scarborough, 69 Taxes at 801. Thus, taxing a corporation initially
upon prepaid income is tantamount to taxing a person upon receiving the proceeds of a loan. This
is overtaxation, because receiving the proceeds of a loan does not result in economic income to the
borrower; the proceeds are offset by the obligation to repay the loan, resulting in no accretion to
wealth. Klein, et al., Federal Income Taxation at 238-39 (cited in note 6). Such overtaxation of
prepaid income can only be justified (as substitute taxation) if the party on the other side of the
transaction, the customer, is being undertaxed by being allowed to deduct, immediately, the pro-
ceeds of the loan. Halperin, 95 Yale L. J. at 517. As an aside, it also should be noted that, economi-
cally speaking, these loans are interest-bearing. The corporation pays interest on the loan,
implicitly, in the sense that the customer receives the services for a lower price by paying early, in
comparison to the higher price the customer would have been charged had it paid later. This
reduction in price is, in economic substance, interest that is paid by the corporation to the cus-
tomer. The economic nature of this payment, however, is disguised and not explicitly stated. Id. at
516.
242. Although this arrangement is quite similar to a partnership, it differs technically from
such an arrangement because the returns from the rail spur inure completely to the manufacturing
firm, while the returns from the remaining assets inure completely to the railroad. Thus, the ar-
rangement lacks one of the true characteristics of a partnership-the sharing of entrepreneurial
profit and risk with respect to the same properties. As a result, it likely would fail to qualify as a
partnership for federal income tax purposes. William S. McKee, William F. Nelson, and Robert L.
Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners 1 3.02[4]-[5] (Warren, Gorham, & La-
mont, 2d ed., 1990); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 Tax L.
Rev. 1, 31-32 nn.120-21 (1991).
243. Other commentators have noted this characteristic of these transactions. See Note, 82
Harv. L. Rev. at 639 (cited in note 2).
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prices it pays for rail transportation, while the railroad continues to
earn a return from the assets in which it has an economic investment.
24'
The tax laws would not ordinarily tax a co-owner of property with re-
spect to the investment in the property by another co-owner.245 Corre-
spondingly, the laws should extend similar treatment to the railroad
here, and not tax it on the receipt of an asset whose economic returns
will inure to another party. In such a situation, the railroad's wealth
does not increase by the receipt of such an asset, and, therefore, taxa-
tion is inappropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
Nonshareholder contributions to corporations represent an impor-
tant array of transactions occurring in our economy. For too long, the
federal income tax treatment of these contributions has been muddled
by archaic and irrelevant concepts that fail to focus on the questions
that are necessary to fashion an intelligible tax policy. Present law is
badly in need of reform to insure that firms are taxed on their economic
income, and that the undesirable effects of mistaxation are eliminated.
I propose taxing firms on amounts received for economic develop-
ment because I believe that systematic market failure occurs in this
area, which results in firms receiving economic income when they sell
development to state and local governments. In contrast, firms should
not be taxed on the receipt of transaction-specific assets, largely be-
cause no evidence indicates that market failure has occureed in this
area. Instead, it appears that the expectations of the various parties in-
volved are generally preserved, and that a customer investing in a spe-
cialized asset continues to receive the future returns from that asset, as
opposed to those returns reverting to the firm.
Finally, it should be noted that the changes proposed in this Arti-
cle are administratively feasible. The proposals could be implemented
without increasing either the complexity of the tax system or the costs
244. This helps explain the difference between prepaid income and contributions of transac-
tion-specific assets. When firms receive prepaid income they eventually realize economic income
from that receipt of property. The proper timing, however, of such realization is deferred until
such time as the firms provide services to the customers. See note 241. When a firm receives a
transaction-specific asset from another, the firm never realizes economic income from that transac-
tion (assuming, for example, that the firm does not appropriate the quasi-rents from the asset).
Instead, the returns from the transaction-specific asset inure to the benefit of the customer
throughout the asset's life. Although a contribution of transaction-specific assets is therefore dis-
tinct from a transaction involving prepaid income, modification of the tax laws regarding prepaid
income to eliminate the overtaxation that presently occurs would not be objectionable. For propos-
als to make such modifications, see Scarborough, 69 Taxes 798 (cited in note 153).
245. See, for example, I.R.C. § 721 (West 1992), which provides that no gain shall be recog-
nized by a partnership or any of its partners, by virtue of a contribution to the partnership of
property in exchange for a partnership interest.
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imposed on persons attempting to comply with the law. Moreover, the
proposals are reasonably balanced in a fiscal sense. Tax monies raised
from taxing economic development could be used, in part, to pay for
the costs of exempting contributions of specialized assets from tax.
Thus, the proposals could be adopted without aggravating the fiscal
problems involving the federal deficit. In short, these proposals would
improve the law in a way that is administratively and fiscally viable.
They deserve serious consideration by policymakers when enacting fu-
ture legislative changes to the tax laws.
